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1P A R T  O N E:
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Subject Matter and Structure.
In terms of both its intentions and genre Bulgaria: Risks of the Political Future is an
early warning paper. The report is divided into four parts.
This part defines the main concepts on which the entire analysis is based. It also
introduces, and gives a preliminary specification of, “Bulgaria’s case” against the background of
the accepted conceptual framework.
Part two presents an analysis of the basic characteristics of Bulgaria’s political system.
Besides its descriptive aspect, it also contains an evaluation of the major risks faced by the
political system.
Part three explores basic features of the current state of Bulgaria’s economy. It contains
an evaluation of those critical points of the present context which are most likely to influence the
future of the socio-political system.
Part four deals with possible, thinkable, or imaginary, as it were, developments. It
considers five scenarios for Bulgaria’s political future for the next ten to fifteen years. All of them
are failure scenarios. Besides unfolding them as possible borderline developments, this part
advances probability assessment for each of them. There is no proposal for a specific positive
scenario. Thus, a positive development would be the hopeful result of heeding recommendations
for avoiding the risks for any of the five scenarios.
1.2 Conceptual Apparatus. Definitions.
There are three concepts which are central to this paper: “weak state”, “risky country
(region)”, “human insecurity”. The entire analysis that follows is based on them. A proper
understanding of its essence depends to a great extent on the understanding of these
conceptual tools.
(a) “Weak state”
We understand a “weak state” to be one where the legitimately elected government
experiences increasing difficulty to exercise its executive functions and implement its policy
projects. It is specific for the “weak state” that it does not imply a legitimation crisis that could be
resolved simply through carrying out early elections. The true problem is that it suffers from a
deficit of political and governmental alternatives. Thus the “weak state” is not involved in a
governmental crisis. It is rather involved in a crisis of governmentality. In the public realm there is
no candidate that could gain political recognition, hence legitimacy, and in effect take over the
functions of the executive. So, a “state” becomes “weak” when the surface-level governmental or
parliamentary crisis is rooted in an overall inability to govern, and not in conflicting power claims
from rival political subjects.1
Let us take an example2. Before 1980s drug trafficking was neither a major factor in
Colombia’s economy nor considered a significant threat to the state. At the time it started
emerging, it was even accepted by the government as it provided jobs and its product was
exported to the U.S. In the 80s this crime activity began to bother it because of its increasing
influence on state institutions, the pressure from the U.S., etc. The government decided to sign
and implement an extradition treaty with the U.S. which would target major drug dealers and
expand the campaign against the drug cartels. The latter responded by a massive wave of
intimidation and open violence and, even more, by the proposal to pay the country’ entire foreign
dept provided the government would repeal the treaty. Under this enormous pressure, which
showed how powerful the drug cartels had become, the Supreme Court overruled the extradition
                                                                
1 It would be helpful to clarify in advance an aspect of the method adopted, which concerns the way of
introducing the basic concepts:
All three definitions are “negative”. They are not derived from a “positive” understanding by way of
negation; we are only interested in what “weak state” means and ignore the question of what a “strong state”
might mean in general. This feature has to do with the character of the entire work and with the objective to
suggest preventive policy recommendations, which are negative, too, as they are directed toward avoiding some
developments.
2 All examples we give to illuminate the main definitions are taken as real boundary cases. We do not think such
unambiguous cases could easily be found in Bulgaria’s recent history, so, for the sake of clarity we refer to
internationally well known developments.
2treaty. The explicit reason for this decision was based on an insignificant detail and, apparently,
was highly controversial. It was obvious that one of the basic state institutions, the Supreme
Court, acted in blatant contradiction with a national interest, which was clearly defined and hardly
disputable. Under pressure from the crime network the frightened Court became an obstacle to
the government’s attempt to solve a problem of national priority. This is a clear case of a “weak
state”.
(b) “Risky country” (respectively “region”)
We use the expression “risky country”, or “region” in a broad yet conceptually strict, that
is, not figurative, manner. In our understanding a “country” can be characterized as “risky” if
crises of various kinds - such as economic, socio-cultural, ethnic, political, institutional, and
others - extend their influence to affect the very societal infrastructure. Such a development
produces a secondary expansion of the crises along various dimensions. If a certain type of
crisis cannot be resolved by available resources and continues to deepen and intensify, it cannot
be contained within the limits of its origin. Instead, it transcends its original scope thus touching
upon structures which are common for other sectors of social life. The possibility for such crisis
expansion, that is, from one or more specific fragments of social life toward its very infrastructure
and after that into various other substructures - renders countries and whole regions as risky. In
and of itself, none of the individual components of social life - such as ethnic conflict, sporadic
violence, institutional weakness, etc. - renders a country risky, until the internal crisis spreads
over society’s infrastructural level.
Let us illuminate this definition by an example. Albania was widely conceived as a
country with good prospects for socio-political transformation and integration into the
international community. Foreign observers failed to consider the phenomenon of the notorious
financial pyramids as a major factor in this process. Contained in certain frames, such financial
schemes exist elsewhere in the world including countries like the U.S. and Switzerland.
Surprisingly, however, it was the pyramids that became the major visible cause for destruction
and disappearance of the network of state institutions in Albania and for the complete
disintegration of the social infrastructure. Once this boundary is crossed, the collapse of these
criminal entities as the pyramids lead to massive robbery of arms warehouses, to formation of
territorial communal enclaves, to blockage of supply, transportation, communication, etc. Albania
thus became an extreme case of “risky country”.
(c) “Human insecurity”
Using the term “human insecurity” we do not mean to introduce a new concept but rather
to give an extended interpretation of the security problematique. The extended view of security is
in accordance with our understanding that today’s sources of risk cannot be reliably defined if we
confine our observation to the political unity of the nation and to the institutions whereby it
organizes itself into a state.3
The conceptual content of the term “human insecurity” should be understood as a
change in perspective from the pole of the state toward the pole of the individual. We do not
take, however, these poles as isolated notions. In between the two extremes we also include,
explicitly or not, some intermediary entities such as families, groups of individuals, communities
of various kinds. In this sense we assume the reference point of the individual as a borderline
case. Or, throughout our work, we are interested in the state of the individual while at the same
time aware of and attempt to account for the fact that every individual is a crosspoint of a manifold
of community or group relations. Thus, whenever some community risk arises, it extends to the
individual. Conversely, if a certain critical mass of communal relations is secure, this state of
security also reaches out to the individual members.
Let us take a third example. Understandably, during the Cold War bi-polar system of
security the (referent) object of security policy was the state. Citizens and various communities
could feel secure because the state had taken on most of the functions for providing security. As
a supplier of security the state was defined territorially, it was constituted as a sovereign,
cohesive, political unity of the nation. In the field of foreign policy its primary task was to protect
itself against other such political units, and it also had monopoly over the internal use of violence.
When U.S. troops and international forces entered Somalia, this object, the state, appeared to be
                                                                
3 This extended interpretation of security has been widely discussed for the last ten years, especially after the
collapse of the bipolar system of security. In the theory and the practice of the UN they were first introduced in
1994 in the framework of the United Nations Development Program. See Human Development Report, 1994.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 22-40.
3tremendously ambiguous.4 Much to the surprise of policy strategists, the Somali state had not
only been destroyed but, even more, it was impossible to revive. It turned out impossible to
provide assistance to restore the disintegrated nation-state institutions as there was no nation
“out there”. Neither were there resources for any kind of national identity which could become a
base for state formation. Quite to the contrary, the intention to bring order by establishing
centralized state government was perceived by the local agents, the “clans”, as a threat and was
strongly opposed by them. Under such conditions the U.S. and the UN contingents were soon
acting as if they were one clan among others. Thus, the referent object of security policy appeared
to be misperceived. This rendered the entire operation highly questionable. The inference one
could easily draw from this development is that the security of individuals and groups inhabiting
this region did not necessarily depend on a state-centered security policy. Under such
circumstances the security of individuals must become the immediate object of security policy.
Hence the need for political strategists to introduce the concept of human (in)security as primary
object of security policy, and only afterwards to consider whether human security could be
provided by relying on conditions that hold for nation-states.
1.3 Structural Unity of the Conceptual Apparatus
The axiomatic part of the conceptual apparatus does not imply the intention to construct
complete, let alone systematic, picture of Bulgaria’s socio-political future. The proposed analysis
is only about possible developments. It neither aims at making prognoses nor at advancing
predictions. The lack of such systematic, or holistic, intentions notwithstanding, the main
conceptual instruments are interrelated in a specific way. They describe stages of crisis
expansion in view of the problem of security.
If a state experiences weakness and growing inability to perform its ordinary functions,
this also implies a growing distance between the state and various sectors of society’s life. If this
crisis deepens, the state may lose control over spheres where its intervention, or preventive
function, is of crucial importance. In this condition some agents that operate in the social realm
but have subversive intentions and character may become as powerful as to replace the state. In
such a case the “weak state” syndrome facilitates, or even directly produces, developments in the
social sphere such that the country, or the region, may qualify as risky.
Organized crime is a typical example. If the state cannot exercise control over crime and
contain it within reasonable limits and degree, the probability for crime activities to be organized
grows significantly. If this process continues, organized crime may expand its activities beyond
spheres where it usually operates. Further, it may penetrate different sectors of social interaction
and impose its own rules therein. An extreme development at this stage would be for organized
crime to duplicate, or totally replace, the function of the state. Given the character and purposes of
organized criminal activities the third stage of this development would be to cause disintegration
of the social infrastructure and create a state of overall insecurity, human insecurity at that.
This imaginary development shows how the three concepts we introduce relate to each
other. They present degrees of aggravation of a situation whereby the weakness of the state may
transform a country or region into risky zones and, finally, create conditions for growing human
insecurity.
1.4 Introducing Bulgaria’s Case
We take Bulgaria to be neither a “weak state” nor a “risky country (region)” per se. But we
believe we do have reasons to take Bulgaria as a country where symptoms of both can easily be
registered. Whether Bulgaria would allow these symptoms to extend their gravity and lead the
country toward some of the extreme cases mentioned above is a question we are attempting to
answer both in the analytic part of the paper and in the part where we propose the worse
possible scenarios.
Let us take an example again. From 1990 till 1997 each and every Bulgarian government
knew perfectly well that in the process of transforming the banking system - from one central
bank with various specialized branches into a central bank and independent commercial banks -
strong control should be exercised over the newly emerging commercial banks. Largely, the
success of the government policy depended on effective enforcement of financial discipline.
Nevertheless, none of the governments in this period succeeded to implement efficient policies
                                                                
4 In respect to this example we are more interested in the attitude of the international strategists and the implicit
view of the object of security policy which was at work in the entire operation. This view reflected the inertia of
the Cold War concept of security as state-centered. By and of itself, the case of Somalia requires a special
analysis and is not of interest here.
4to prevent Bulgaria from verging on a complete collapse of the banking system. The fact that six
successive governments could not handle the banking situation means that there is a recurrent,
systematic inability involved in this aspect of policy making. Thus one has sufficient ground to
characterize this development as crisis of governance instead of a crisis of this or that separate
government. A side effect of this weakness was the fact that none of the governments enjoyed
credibility before the international financial institutions as none of them could guarantee
implementation of signed agreements. This situation reveals symptoms of a “weak state”.
Let us develop the example a little bit further. In the period 1990-1995 certain circles set
up new banks by using political leverage and exercising pressure on the National Bank to grant
them licenses. Thereafter, some used the resources of the newly established banks for
registering insurance companies. Some insurance companies “attracted” their clients by
racketeering them. In this way, otherwise dispersed racketeering activities were organized and
consolidated. In effect, several powerful crime networks emerged. They had political connections,
legitimate presence in the financial system, were able to participate in the privatization process,
and could easily penetrate small businesses affecting them in the way they would like to, etc.
This example shows how the state weakness can result in a “risky country (region)”. It is a story
about the symptom of “risky country”.
Now, let us take a look backward and define in a more precise manner, and against the
background of this preparatory work, how we view Bulgaria’s case.
First, the conceptual apparatus provides information on what ideal types of
developments and cases we are interested in; that is to say, it specifies parameters along which
we are to unfold our analytic observation and, afterwards, construct possible scenarios.
Second, we presented a number of examples aimed at elucidating the conceptual
background through really existing extreme developments and cases which fall in the realm
determined by our conceptual framework.
Third, we assume that Bulgaria has not reached such a borderline state. At the same
time, we raise the claim that it exhibits a number of symptoms that can be analyzed in terms of
our central concepts of “weak state” and “risky country (region)”.
Thus we take Bulgaria’s case as one that does not exclude in advance this country’s
possible transformation into a boundary state of crisis, chaos, disintegration, collapse, etc. From
this point of view it is necessary to introduce a distinction which plays an important role in our
analytic strategy:
It is one consideration what, under the circumstances, is possible to occur.
And, it is quite another what is probable.
Strictly speaking, the scenario approach relates more to what is possible, that is, not
excluded, whereas risk assessment relates more to the probability of various bad scenarios to
develop. By assessing the risk we refer to different factors which contribute to increasing or
reducing it. So, this assessment entails inevitably recommendations concerning preventive
policy.
It follows that the assumed understanding of security, besides being extended to
individuals and communities, is based on the idea of prevention and exclusion. We do not
advance recommendations that this or that policy be followed in order for something specific to
be achieved. Rather, we give recommendations that this or that policy be followed in order for the
worst possible scenarios to be avoided. To sum up, we are recommending policies that will
make some possible developments less probable .
5P A R T   T W O:
BULGARIA'S POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
Introduction
The events in 1997 revealed the factors which will determine the prospects for
Bulgaria’s social, political and economic development in the next ten to fifteen years. The political
and economic crisis which shook the country in the winter of 1996 was indicative of the essential
characteristics of the political and economic system of Bulgaria. A discussion of future political
risks should begin with an assessment of institutional stability. An assessment of the role of the
Constitution, the party system, trade unions, the media, and political elite, as well as the role of
the army, will outline the institutional environment for Bulgaria’s political future. The major issues
discussed in this chapter are as follows:
· Political institutions in Bulgaria.
· Their roles since 1991.
· Institutional changes which can be expected..
The expected changes will be discussed in terms of their effect on the level of country
risk.
2.1 Political System. General Characteristics
The present political system emerged as a result of the “negotiated transition”, which
started with the Round Table Talks in February-March 1990, the adoption of the new Constitution
(July 12, 1991), and a series of elections and governments. The Constitution established a
parliamentary form of government, with a directly elected President, and a Constitutional Court to
oversee Parliament’s compliance with the Constitution. The electoral system is proportional, with
a four-percent threshold for Parliamentary representation. The political system in Bulgaria over
the past seven years has demonstrated sustainable elements. Its key features will continue to
determine the sustainability of the system over the next ten to fifteen years. The present analysis
will focus on these features.
2.2 Elections
Bulgaria is the only country in South-Eastern Europe with an established practice of free
and fair elections. Since 1991, the electoral system has remained unchanged. All electoral
results were accepted by participating parties and international observers. Both incumbents and
the opposition received approximately equal media coverage in the state media, and the fact that
the opposition won the elections in 1991, 1994 and 1997 should corroborate the point that
Bulgaria is an exception to the “Balkan tradition” of contested and predetermined elections 5.
Turnout has been relatively high (averaging about 70%). The trend, however, is for turnout to
decline. As a rule, Bulgarians are more active in national elections (parliamentary, presidential)
than in local elections (see Appendix One, Bulgarskite Izbori 1990-1996).
Currently, elections are the most stable, as well as the most stabilising, institution of
Bulgarian democracy. Despite doubts as to the general performance of democratic governments,
public opinion is not ready to question free elections. (Gallup Annual Reports)
In the short run, the electoral system will be subject to debate. Starting with 1994, there
has been permanent pressure for a shift from the proportional representation (PR) system to
majoritarian representation. The major arguments against the existing PR system are (1) the
selection process of future MPs is confined to the respective party leadership circles (2) MPs are
loyal to their parties and not to voters (3) all politics is national and local problems are ignored (4)
the PR system often results in fragmented Parliaments and minority governments. Public
criticism against the PR representation reflects a more general public disappointment with the
failure of three successive Parliaments to perform efficiently. The inefficiency of Parliament has
been blamed on the electoral system. This is the reason to expect that a successful performance
of the present Parliament and the government it has elected will reduce public pressure for
changes in the electoral system.
In the short run, there is one major factor diminishing the probability of a radical change
of the electoral system. A majoritarian system will limit the power of party leadership, and under
the current system, it is the party leadership that has the mandate to initiate these changes.
                                                                
5 The disputed elections in Albania and Slobodan Milosevic's manipulation of the 1996 local election results are
the best illustration of this "Balkan tradition".
6In order to promote changes in the electoral law, either the parliamentary majority must feel
threatened by the existing PR system, or public pressure must escalate to a level that would
make it impossible for the parliamentary majority to ignore it.
In the next three to five years, the probability of any change in the electoral system will
depend on the stability of the present Parliament.
Policy Issues
If the present Parliament fails to deliver and new elections are scheduled before the end
of 1998, changes in the electoral system are highly probable. The choice of electoral system will
be of key importance. The adoption of a mixed system, a combination of majoritarian and
proportional elements, will consolidate the democratic system. The adoption of the first-past-the-
post system would create an opportunity for parliamentary underrepresentation of significant
social segments and reduce the consensual character of the regime.
If the present Parliament succeeds in fulfilling its term, the electoral system is not likely to
change. Avenues to improve political representation will be sought in the parties' legislative
recruitment mechanisms.
The model of primary vote for the selection of Presidential candidates, already launched
by UDF, will most likely be preserved. The other parties will be under pressure to adopt more
transparent procedures for candidate selection.
2.3 The Constitution
The Constitution, quite predictably contested in the beginning, has also proved to be a
stabilizing factor in political life. Bulgaria was the first post-communist country to adopt an entirely
new Constitution. Since 1991, the Constitution has been the target of public criticism on several
accounts, but has emerged as an effective guarantee of the predictability of political life. The
Constitution was a key factor which helped avoid undesirable political developments during the
winter crisis of 1996-1997. All major political parties have repeatedly declared their loyalty to the
existing Basic Law.
In the near term, the debate on the Constitution will revolve around two major issues,
empowering the President and whether to grant land purchasing rights to foreign physical and
juridical persons. The very complex procedure for constitutional amendments is the major
constraint to the designed amendments 6.
The fact that UDF withdrew all constitutional amendments from its 1997 legislative
agenda indicates that the ruling majority does not command a stable support on constitutional
issues. The dynamics of political life in Bulgaria suggests that it is more probable for UDF to
withdraw their constitutional initiative altogether.
Policy Issues
1. The debated Constitutional amendment allowing foreign physical and juridical
persons in Bulgaria to buy land will send a strong message to foreign investors. The adoption of
this amendment will reassure investors of a commitment for radical change in this country's
investment climate. This message is very needed because political instability and institutional
xenophobia are among the investors' major concerns. Moreover, the adoption of such an
amendment will be a move towards the harmonization of Bulgarian legislation to conform to EU
legal standards.
We must note that this measure could be misused for partisan purposes. Polling figures
indicate that a majority of the population fears "relinquishing land" to foreigners. Hence, the need
for an aggressive public campaign to ensure that this initiative of the parliamentary majority will
not backfire. In all probability, the government will not risk sponsoring this amendment before
securing a reliable public endorsement.
2. Empowering the President has been a permanent issue in the center of the political
debate. Disappointment with Parliament7 moved public opinion to the idea of presidentialism.
Former President Zhelev is among the most outspoken supporters of the presidential form of
government. The incredible popularity of the present President Stoyanov (whose approval rating
is above eighty percent) is also a factor for the constitutional change.
                                                                
6  The Constitution can be amended with the votes of 3/ 4 of all MPs, or with the votes of 2/3 of all MPs, if the
votes are cast twice within three months. Fundamental provisions in the Constitution may be amended solely by
a Constituent Assembly.
7 Parliament's approval reached an all-time low of seven percent in February 1997.
7(a) Presidential legislative initiative. If the President is given legislative initiative, his draft
laws can be defeated in Parliament, and in reality the President will be weakened.
(b) Referendum power. The proposal to give the President (exclusive!) right to call national
referenda is controversial as well. The political experience in countries like Belarus and
Kazahstan suggests that instruments of direct democracy (especially national referenda) can
subvert democracy and stability.
Amendments affecting the division of power between institutions are more likely to
destabilize, rather than consolidate, the political system. Proposals for constitutional
empowerment of the President will most likely face opposition from non-ruling parties in
Parliament, despite strong public support for this change.
2.4 Party System
During the Second Republic (after 1991), a bipolar multiparty system was adopted. More
than 200 parties have been registered since 1989 - only 50 members are required for formal
registration. However, only two parties (or election coalitions) have won elections during the
period in question: the Union of Democratic Forces, or UDF (the biggest right-centrist party) - in
1991 and 1997, and the Bulgarian Socialist Party, or BSP (the former communist party) - in 1990
and 1994. Besides these two, no more than two or three parties or coalitions have entered
Parliament at any time.
The crisis in the beginning of 1997 which divested BSP of executive power and opened
the space for the left-and-right of center parties put under question the stability of the bipolar
model. The major factors eroding the stability of the bipolar system are (1) the decline of support
for BSP and especially the fact that the socialists’ electoral base is much older than the voters of
the other major parties (Bulgarskite izbori) (2) the emergence of a modernized Left (the European
Left Party).
An analysis of the dynamics of public attitudes assumes that the bipolar character of the
party system will remain unchanged. The decline of BSP is not accompanied by a significant shift
in the support of the center-left parties. BSP has retained its position as the major opposition
party. UDF and BSP (or coalitions dominated by them) will remain major political forces (See
Appendix Two, Bulgarian Parties). We can expect that UDF and BSP will develop as center-right
and center-left populist parties, respectively, with UDF retaining a leading role in the near future.
One of the specificities of the party system in Bulgaria is the parliamentary
representation of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, or MRF, the political party of ethnic
Turks in Bulgaria8. The Constitution bans the formation of ethnically-based parties, while the
previously adopted electoral law had made the registration of MRF legal. The Constitutional Court
made the historic compromise to pronounce MRF legal. Since, political life has proved the
extreme value of the MRF as a political and social stabilizer through the influence it exercises over
the majority, over the Turkish and Muslim minority, and also over minorities that have not been
able to produce viable political organizations and gain representation, such as the Gypsies of
Bulgaria. In the course of the next 10 to 15 years, the Bulgarian Turks will retain their electoral
importance. However, the chances for effective independent participation of MRF in the elections
will diminish with time. The major reasons for the diminishing role of MRF as an independent
player are the economic emigration and the decline in the electoral turnout of the Bulgarian Turks,
as well as the emergence of powerful MRF splinter groups, now within the United Democratic
Forces, which are felt to better represent the interests of traditional MRF voters.
Policy Issues
The parliamentary representation of the Bulgarian Turks is a factor for the country's
political stability. The isolation of the MRF can result in the emergence of radical minority parties.
The strategy for complete integration of the Turkish voters into major national parties can increase
the risk of regional instability.
2.5 Political Elite
In the course of the last seven years the public witnessed three waves of re-alignment of
the political elite. The first, in 1990-1991, marked the dissidents’ entrance into political life and
the removal of Zhivkov’s circle. The second, 1991-1996, opened the political space for the
ideology-driven elite -- radical anti-communists on the right (Philip Dimitrov) and nostalgic hard-
liners on the left (Videnov). The third wave starting with the elections in April 1997 can be labeled
                                                                
8 In the last national census (December 1992), the Turkish minority in Bulgaria constituted 9.41% of the
population.
8“pragmatic”. Gradually, all political parties have eliminated “the old” (i. e. older than 60) and
political life is dominated by the 40-55 year-olds who have made their political careers during the
last seven years. The leading figures of the old communist nomenclatura were “sent into
retirement”, along with the leading anti-communist dissidents. The freshman class of MPs
constitutes 2/3 of Parliament. Having been thus formed, the present political elite will play a
crucial role during the next 10 to 15 years. Some arguments for the stability of the present political
elite are: its local power base, its pragmatic profile, and the general trends which can be
observed in the other post-communist countries. It can be presumed that President Stoyanov,
UDF leader Kostov, and the leader of the European Left Tomov will retain their positions in the
near future. Stoyanov’s term ends in the year 2000, so he will be the major political player at least
in the short-run. The President's high popularity, and the support of UDF he enjoys makes his re-
election to a second presidential term highly probable. Kostov and Tomov enjoy full uncontested
control over their parties which is a strong argument for long political careers.
The Bulgarian political elite is fraught with corruption and political clientelism, but lacks
the nepotism for which this part of Europe used to be renowned. The business and cultural elites
are underinstitutionalized.
2.6. Trade Unions
 Trade unions were very active in Bulgaria’s political life in 1990 to 1992. They were key
actors in the 700-plus strikes during this two-year period. The two major trade unions, Podkrepa
and The Confederation of the Independent Trade Unions (CITU), were structured following the
major political division within society: communists versus anti-communists (CITU -- leftist,
Podkrepa -- anti-communist). Following 1992, their political importance has been in decline.
Among the reasons for the decline of the trade unions’ political influence are: their failure to adopt
strategies compatible with the policies of structural adjustment, their failure to draw a line
between political and trade-unionist activism, and the collaboration and “merger” between trade
unions and the business elite.
 A key feature of the trade-unionist movement is that it covers the state sector of the economy
exclusively. In protecting workers’ interests, trade unions are always in confrontation with the
state, and are thus pushed to behave either in a corporatist or militant way.
 
Policy Issues
 Over the next ten to fifteen years, Bulgaria’s political system will face the problem of trade
unions being too weak, rather than too powerful. Indicative of the trade unions' loss of power are
the decrease in the number of unionized workers, the emergence of new trade unions
(Promyana), the concentration of unionized workers in the technologically backward industrial
sectors (mining, metal processing), and the reluctance of political parties to work with trade
unions. The experience of other post-communist countries9 suggests that powerful unions are
likely to be a problem, rather than an asset, for reforms.
 
2.7 Army
The army, which during the 20-s and 30-s of this century repeatedly played a crucial role
in Bulgarian politics, has not acted as an independent factor at any time over the past seven
years. The political non-participation of the army is a permanent trend which has its reasons in
the subordinate role which the army played under the communist system, and the fact that
effective civilian control was established shortly after the changes. The conscription basis of the
Bulgarian army and the lack of recent war experience are additional factors discouraging active
army involvement. And finally, the new geopolitical situation creates an environment which does
not tolerate independent participation of the military in political life. It should be noted that the
army is in dire need of a comprehensive vision for its new role.
Policy Issues
Two major factors will be key to the reform in the army – defense budget constrains and
Bulgaria’s commitment to join NATO. Adjustment to NATO standards will hurt the budget and the
economic reforms as a whole. However, in the medium term, any postponement of the reforms
will increase the level of political risk.
Bulgaria’s army has an interest to follow the policy of adjusting to NATO standards even if
Bulgaria’s membership in the Alliance is problematic. The very process of reforming the army will
be the best guarantee for effective civilian control.
                                                                
9 Poland is a case in point.
92.8 Media
The media have largely enjoyed real freedom of expression, which has made them a
major player in social and political life over the past 7 years. In 1991, there were 750 registered
newspapers in Bulgaria; in 1995 they were 1,058. Compared with Albania or Serbia where
newspapers are banned, and with Turkey where more than 40 journalists are in prison, Bulgaria
is positively a free speech zone. The fact that there are more than 400 cable channels and 94
licensed private broadcasters is a further argument in support of this observation.
Policy Issues
In the short run, two crucial factors will determine the media environment. The state will
continue to lose its monopoly over the electronic media (a couple of private companies are about
to receive national TV coverage licenses). On the other hand, one publishing group10 effectively
controls 80% of the newspaper market. Both developments are worrying, as the legal
environment for both the public and private electronic media is not regulated. The existence of
many unlicensed cable operators can cause a problem in a situation of local conflict. Media
outlets can be misused in the absence of effective, and enforceable, regulations. An unsound
legal basis, coupled with faulty definitions of professional behavior, undermines media
accountability.
2.9 NGO Community
Currently, there are more than 4,500 registered non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Most of
these registered NGOs are not functioning. The number of functioning NGOs does not exceed
400-500, and most of them are concentrated in Sofia. The legal basis for the third sector is
underdeveloped. The draft law prepared by the NGO community was not included the 1997
governmental legislative agenda. There are no incentives for companies and individuals to
contribute to NGOs. More than 90 percent of all grants and contributions to leading Bulgarian
NGOs come from foreign donors. The total dependency on outside funding and lack of active
community foundations affects the sustainability of the third sector (sustainability index).
Policy Issues
Given the crisis of the welfare state in Bulgaria, the sustainability of the third sector is of
great importance. A network of community foundations and charity organizations can fill the gap
following the state’s withdrawal from the social sphere. The NGOs' capacity to assume an active
role in public life will depend on the following factors:
(a) effective changes in the legal environment – a new NGO law ought to be adopted.
(b) changes in the tax code to create incentives for businesses and individuals to make
contributions to the NGO sector.
(c) integration of civic groups and policy institutes in the decision-making process.
2.10 Conclusions
The review of the nature and stability of Bulgaria’s political system leads to several
conclusions with a view to the country’s medium-term development perspectives.
· A series of crises caused the present consolidation of Bulgarian democracy. Therefore,
Bulgarian democracy is not growth-dependent. It can be expected that the democratic
institutions will service the shock of structural unemployment and cuts in the public spending,
which will take place in 1997-1999.
· There is no political party or influential public group which could come up with alternatives to a
democratic system or discard democratic rules. All major parties and social groups accept
free elections and multiparty system. Military coup is improbable.
· No conditions, internal or external, exist In Bulgaria for the establishment of  a stable
authoritarian regime. Political stability can be achieved only as a democratic stability. The
declared public support for "strong hand" is a reaction to the "weakness" of the state but no
agent of authoritarian change is visible.
· The parliamentary presence of the Bulgarian Movement for Rights and Freedoms in two
successive parliamentarian majorities is a sufficient guarantee against an all-country
ethnically driven conflict. The fact that Turks are parliamentary represented reduces the risk for
ethnic conflicts.
                                                                
10 The German Westdeutsche Algemeine Zeitung.
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· At the same time, the political system is state-oriented and is still poisoned with
governmental instability (Governments have a high death-rate: the average Bulgarian
government after 1990 having ruled for less than a year.). And there are symptoms for the
"weakness" of the state. Since 1991 Bulgaria has not fulfilled any of the agreement with IMF.
In the framework of this analysis the major problem of Bulgaria’s political system is  how
to ensure that there be at least two reformist governments in succession.
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P A R T   T H R E E:
BULGARIA‘S ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Introduction
As of 1997, Bulgaria can serve as the paramount example of a failed economic
transition. Economic reforms were introduced in February 1991. Of the following six years only
two - 1994 and 1995 - recorded mediocre economic growth, while based on the monthly
consumer price indices there was never a twelve-month period in which prices rose less than 26
percent.11 By the end of 1996 the country’s real GDP was around two thirds of its 1989 value, the
banking sector was experiencing a severe credibility crisis accompanied with bank failures, the
Bulgarian currency was in a state of free falling, and prices were rising at a hectic double-digit
speed, which in February 1997 reached hyperinflationary proportions.12 At that moment it became
clear to the vast majority of Bulgarians that the only way out of the catastrophe was the
implementation of radical and internationally supported reform of the economic system.
In the following months this new attitude resulted in two big changes: elections were
held in April, which replaced the old anti-reform parliamentary majority with a new, pro-reform
one, and a strict currency board was introduced on July 1, after the necessary legislation was
adopted. The result was a quick monetary and fiscal stabilization, and an entirely different outlook
for the future of Bulgaria’s economy. While many serious risks remain, there is also a definite
possibility for an overall favorable development.
3.1 The Financial Sector
The first two months of the currency board regime in Bulgaria can be characterized by a
lack of surprises. There has been no pressure on the exchange rate, pegged at 1000 Bulgarian
leva per 1 German mark, the base interest rate, determined by the weekly auctions of 3-month T-
bills, fell precipitously from around 18 percent monthly in March down to less than 6 percent
annually in August13, the inflation rate, while a bit higher than expected by the politicians and by
the public, is in the single digits monthly14, and seems to threaten neither the National Bank
reserves, nor the execution of the budget. By the end of August 1997, the total assets of the
currency board exceed 3.7 billion German marks.
There are, however, many possible risks facing the future of the currency board in
Bulgaria. In the short term, the higher inflation of the lev relative to the German mark may lead to a
real appreciation of the Bulgarian currency which may damage the balance of payments. At the
same time, the combination of high inflation and low interest rates leads to negative real interest
rates, which may have two effects: (1) the public will withdraw its support for the lev and cause a
re-dollarization of the economy, and (2) the foreign portfolio investors may continue the trend from
May and June15, withdraw their investments and cause a drain of the National Bank’s reserves. All
this may put a serious strain on the already fragile financial system.
                                                                
11 The annual real GDP growth, inflation and unemployment are given in the following table (source: NSI):
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Real GDP Growth (%) -11.7 -7.3 -1.5 +1.8 +2.1 -10.9
Inflation (%) 473.5 79.5 63.9 121.9 32.9 310.8
Unemployment (%) 10.7 15.2 16.4 12.8 11.1 12.5
12 During the last three months of the Socialist government of Jean Videnov, the inflation rate was 26.9 %, 43.8
%, and 242.7 % for December 1996, January and February 1997 respectively. Source: NSI.
13 Source: “Capital” weekly, 1997, various issues.
14 Cumulative inflation for the period April-July 1997 is 9.6 %, while the cumulative inflation for the preceding 4
months was over 600 % (source: BNB Monthly Information Bulletin, 1997, various issues). In another comparison,
in the first two months after the introduction of the currency board in Bulgaria, the monthly inflation rate averages
4.6 %, while for the same two months it averaged 21.5 % in Estonia in 1992, and 4.0 % in Lithuania in 1994.
The average monthly inflation in Estonia and Lithuania over the 12 months after the introduction of a currency
board was 6.9 % and 3.2 % respectively. It will be considerably lower in Bulgaria if the currency board continues
to be strictly enforced.
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There is another potentially very serious problem, facing the financial system under the
currency board in the short term. In the 1991-1996 period, the banking sector was in constant
turmoil, and seemed to specialize mostly in foreign exchange speculation and in generous
provision of bad loans. After the crisis of 1996, which seems to have made Bulgarian banks
highly risk averse and unwilling to give credits, and the pegging of the lev to the German mark in
1997, which effectively precluded their access to easy profits on the foreign exchange market, the
banking sector in Bulgaria proves to be quite unprepared to start specializing in the sphere of its
most fundamental comparative advantage: the identification of investment opportunities and the
management of investment risk.16 The quick stabilization achieved in the few months immediately
preceding and following the introduction of the currency board, leading to a situation of very high
liquidity of the banks, may thus be deceiving and may cause a very serious long-term problem of
the whole financial system to be overlooked.
In the longer term, the currency board, being a mechanism for enforcement of hard
budget constraints, will inevitably result in economic hardship and unemployment for possibly
large and possibly strongly concentrated groups of people.17 At the same time, by introducing a
qualitatively new business environment in Bulgaria, the currency board will carry with it new
winners and new losers, and, if the latter are numerous and influential enough, this may cause a
public perception of unfairness of this new mechanism. This may seriously undermine, both on
the local and on the national level, the public support for the reforms.
In conclusion, even though the introduction of a currency board has definitely led to
monetary stabilization, the most realistic assumption is that in the medium term the financial
sector in Bulgaria will be nervous, risk-averse, and fragile. Bank failures are likely, people may
start having doubts about the reforms, and if both the bankers and the public are not prepared for
such eventualities, panics may follow.
Policy Issues.
A very potent tool against some of the problems facing the operation of the currency
board is anticipation. If the possible problems are recognized as a normal part of radical reform,
and if their emergence and effects are carefully and consistently explained to the business and
financial community, they may cause trouble, but will not be able to destabilize the system.
Simultaneously, different policy tools can be used to help the banking sector to assume its
natural functions with respect to investment and risk. For example, lending activities can be
stimulated by providing information to and facilitating contacts between banks and businesses.
At the same time, social safety measures, such as organizing qualification courses, and creating
information banks about alternative employment, should be planned, financially secured, and in
place by the time when the proper working hard budget constraints will inevitably cause
displacement and highly localized crises.
3.2 The Role of the Government: Structural Reform
The present Bulgarian government is faced by the necessity to implement structural
reforms and preserve at least some level of social safety in a currency board environment. The
most important components of structural reform in the case of Bulgaria are privatization,
institutional reform, and law enforcement.
At present, the Bulgarian economy is still heavily dominated by the government sector18,
despite the fact that all four major types of privatization have been tried over the 1991-1996 period:
                                                                                                                                                                                 
15 In May and June 1997, foreign portfolio investors, faced with lowering interest rates and absence of capital
markets withdrew about 100 million of the 300 million US dollars brought into the country after the peaceful
settlement of the political crisis in February.
16 This became particularly obvious during the harvesting of the grain in July and August 1997, when Bulgarian
banks easily and readily financed the campaign to the tune of several hundred billion leva, while at the same
time consistently refused loans to businesses, the only difference between the firms from the other sectors and the
grain producers being the presence of state guarantees for the grain harvest.
17 Some preliminary estimates made public by government officials through the media, claim that the closing
and restructuring of losing enterprises will increase unemployment by between 100 and 150 thousand people,
which is roughly 2.5 to 4.0 percentage points, and, if the end of July 1997 figure is taken as base, unemployment
will rise to around 700 thousand people, or around 18.3 %. The main problem is not the number, but the fact
that this unemployment will be concentrated in small towns and rural regions where most of the losing state
owned enterprises are situated.
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mass privatization, sale to investors, restitution, and worker-management buyouts. The most
important reasons for the lack of success in privatization so far are the lack of political will to
privatize, the resistance by the state bureaucracy and by the managers of the state-owned
enterprises, the absence of a capital market, and the spread of corruption. Of these, only the first
factor seems to have all but disappeared after the April 1997 elections. The others still remain
and the degree to which the present government succeeds in neutralizing them will be a major
determinant for the success of the current privatization drive.
Corruption, too, is an important component but it cannot stop privatization. It can only
slow it down, make it more costly, and damage the image of the reform policies, all of which are
developments with potentially serious undesirable effects. Creating a capital market, some work
on which is already being done, is an absolutely necessary condition for any success in
privatization. It is expected that by the end of 1997 Bulgaria will have a functioning capital market,
even though the present plans include a somewhat heavy government involvement. The most
important problem is overcoming the resistance, especially at the local level, to privatization. Such
resistance, especially when it represents a coordinated effort by middle level central government
bureaucrats, local government officials (as in the case of land restitution), and CEOs of state-
owned enterprises, may not only block the privatization of a given state asset, but has the
potential of creating local crises, which may have national repercussions. It can also successfully
drive potential foreign strategic investors away, and damage the overall investment image of the
country.
The second component of structural reform, institutional reform, consists of restructuring
the formal and informal norms of economic behavior in a way which, when enforced, will
decrease the costs of starting and doing business. The program of the new government
ambitiously outlines the basic changes it will introduce in the whole field of economic legislation,
but most of the work remains to be done. One major risk on this front is the possibility that the
government will not be able to muster political support for some important institutional changes,
for example the abolition of the constitutional ban on foreign persons to own Bulgarian
agricultural land, the introduction of different tax and tariff structures, etc. Another risk is the
possibility that special interests will be able to block or compromise the adoption of favorable
institutional changes, with the ensuing internal conflicts in the regulation of economic activity,
increase in transaction costs, and stimulation of non-productive behavior. A third, and often
underestimated, risk is the potential conflict between formal and informal rules of behavior due to
the change in formal rules. When people’s informal beliefs and norms of behavior clash with the
newly introduced legislative rules, the costs of implementing reforms can increase dramatically,
and their philosophy can be undermined. As an example, there is a firmly ingrained belief, held by
many Bulgarians, that the state is under obligation to provide them with jobs and free
healthcare.19 Since this is impossible in a genuinely market economy, the privatization and
closing of losing enterprises with the consequent unemployment and the healthcare reform
centered at establishing private paid healthcare will go against such a belief, and may be viewed
as a refusal on the part of the state to fulfill its fundamental obligations and from there the whole
economic reform may be viewed as unfair.
The third, and at this stage most crucial, component of structural reform is law
enforcement. Over the last several years the state has virtually lost its monopoly over violence and
is not capable of effectively enforcing the very rules it adopts legislatively. This inability to enforce
rules means that economic structural reform, which is supposedly a fundamental change in
economic responsibility and decision making, can fall prey to different special interests, corrupt
individuals, and organized crime. Some of the most serious problems with inflation of basic
goods and falling output can be directly traced to the activities of different criminal groups which
are able to create and enforce their own “market” rules and, as long as they remain unscathed by
a government sanction, are able to make reforms introduced at the national level irrelevant. The
present Bulgarian government seems to understand the importance of this issue, and has
undertaken different actions against such activities. So far, however, the campaign against
organized crime and special interests seems uncoordinated and ad hoc. There is a reasonable
chance that, once the government action becomes broader and deeper, and once the potential of
organized crime to resist and secure the revenues necessary for resisting the government
                                                                                                                                                                                 
18 Six years after the start of reforms, only about 20 % of the government economic assets have been privatized,
while in 1996 the gross value added in the private sector is still only 47.4 % of the gross value added in the
economy, and 45.6 % of the GDP. Source: NSI.
19Such beliefs find support in the Bulgarian constitution, adopted in 1991 by an ex-communist dominated
majority in a Grand National Assembly, which guarantees to the Bulgarian citizens many entitlements, among
which  the right to work (art. 48), and the right to healthcare and free access to medical services (art. 52).
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decreases,20 the government will be able to bring down the criminal activities to some tolerable
level which will allow for legitimate economic activities to take over. Such a development,
however, is by no means certain, and the risk for government failure on this front remains
disturbingly significant.
Policy Issues.
No matter how it proceeds, privatization will take time, and will always be surrounded by
scandals. It is important for the government to find the delicate balance between complete
avoidance of scandal and corruption, and fast sale of state assets. The simple fact that there will
most likely always be some corrupt individual somewhere along the different deals, and also
some losers who will defend their interests by throwing accusations, should be acknowledged
and treated not as failure of privatization, but as a normal problem which has to be carefully
treated with time, but which is not a reason to stop the whole process. Another very simple way to
privatize the economy, i.e. to increase the proportion of assets whose management is private
responsibility, is not only to sell or give state owned assets, but to foster the already existing
private sector21 by providing market, credit and investment information, and by helping smaller
businesses establish connections on the national and global markets.
Institutionally, before adopting new legislation, it is necessary to coordinate it with
existing laws, and to research how such legislation will be accepted and interpreted by the public
by using various public opinion polls and expert studies. Another important long term policy, for
which the government should establish reputation, is the stability of the institutional environment:
the government should work on convincing the economic agents that the new rules will last, and
will be changed infrequently and only after profound discussion and explanation. Such an
approach will significantly decrease uncertainty and, therefore, transaction costs, and will have a
strong positive effect on economic activity.
On the issue of enforcement, the government can start by creating a framework for
coordination of the efforts of the different branches of power in fighting organized crime and
corruption. This framework may include exchange of information and mutual planning of specific
actions, and should concentrate especially on the interaction between the executive and the
judiciary at the local level, where the criminal groups usually operate.
3.3 The Role of the Government: Fiscal Problems
The most important problem facing the treasury is financing the budget in a currency
board environment, where the printing press is not an option any more. At the same time, both on
the revenue, and on the expenditure side, changes in the structure have to be made to foster
reform and secure growth. This problem will not be resolved in the near future, but the medium
term prospects are promising.
In 1996, the budget deficit was close to 11 % of GDP, mainly due to the explosion of
interest payments on both the internal (due to the drastic increase of the base interest rate to 300
% by the National Bank in a futile attempt to curb the double digit monthly inflation) and the foreign
(due to the precipitous fall in the exchange rate of the lev) debt.22 Possibly even more damaging to
the size of the deficit was the fact that the budget was amended twice during the year, which
seriously damaged any existing trust in the government, increased the uncertainty and raised the
inflationary expectations. Such problems do not seem to be present in 1997. Even though the
Budget Act was passed as late as June, its central parameters were coordinated with the IMF, its
implementation is monitored by the international financial institutions, and the government has
been careful to consistently stress that there will be no changes in the law. The budget envisages
a 6.2 % budget deficit, most of which is due to the high interest payments at the beginning of the
year.23 The presence of the currency board ensures that there will be no inflationary financing of
                                                                
20 One example for a favorable development in this respect was the end of the war in Yugoslavia, which brought
about a softening of the embargo, and thus cut off a major source of easy revenue for many petty and organized
criminals and criminal groups.
21 This sector has demonstrated an amazing growth potential: between 1991 and 1995 it grew by around 100
percent in real terms, before dropping 10 percent in 1996. Source: National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria,
“Statisticheski Spravochnik” (“Statistical Reference Annual”), 1995-1997, sections on National Accounts.
22 Source: Bulgarian National Bank, “Annual Report, 1996”.
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the deficit, and that there will be help provided by the international financial institutions if
necessary, at least in the next two to three years. In the longer term the only danger to the budget
will be presented by the possibility for populist proposals to be adopted, to increase government
expenditures, and thus to put pressure on the currency board itself. This is not very likely, and if
the present trend of falling and low interest rates continues, the Bulgarian budget may easily
become balanced, or even record a surplus in the not very distant future.24 The main reason for
this is that, even though foreign debt service will remain high25, its size will likely decrease as a
proportion of GDP if economic growth takes place and its service will be supervised by the
international financial institutions, while at the same time the low domestic interest rates will
bring domestic debt service down from its peak of 16 % of GDP to less than 5 % of GDP in the
foreseeable future.26 Thus, government finances do not, by themselves, present a problem for the
reform in Bulgaria. The only ways in which they may increase the risks facing the economy, is if
the structural reform fails, or if populism returns.
Policy Issues.
The successful implementation of the 1997 budget means that in the medium run there
may be room for more active fiscal policy. The budget will not be in danger if fiscal tools are used
to both decrease the burden on the tax payers, and accumulate funds to secure the
implementation of reforms. On the revenue side, the government is working with experts from the
international financial institutions to overhaul the tax system, introduce stability in the tax
regulations, decrease tax rates, and improve collection.
3.4 Economic Activity
After the hyperinflationary month of February 1997, when all but the very basic economic
activities came to a virtual standstill, the fiscal and monetary stabilization, accompanied by the so
far credible signs for the beginning of structural reform, has produced an environment conducive
for economic growth. By the end of August 1997, there is a general consensus among official and
private observers that the economic environment is improving27, while the GDP forecasts for 1998
range from 0 to 4 % real growth. Another indirect indication for the improved outlook for the
economy is the desire expressed by different agencies, such as Merrill Lynch, Deutsche Morgan
Grenfell and Paribas, to have the Bulgarian international credit rating updated from its present
lowest possible value of B3, which will improve the access of both the government and the private
sector to the international capital markets, and will raise the market value of the state-owned
enterprises to be privatized.
Some of the driving forces for this development are small private businesses, which are
able to mobilize resources and increase production quickly and without the need to invest large
sums first, foreign investments, which have considerably increased during the year28, and net
exports, which merit some special attention. The Bulgarian economy is very open, with a total
foreign trade turnover higher than 75 % of GDP consistently over the 1992-1996 period29, and
possibly the easiest way towards economic recovery in the short run is to raise aggregate
demand by increasing net exports. The export producing sectors of the economy can benefit in
the short term from the depreciation of the German mark, which makes their products relatively
                                                                                                                                                                                 
23 At the end of June 1997, the deficit of the consolidated state budget is 374.245 million leva, which is 2.3 % of
the projected GDP for 1997. More than half of this deficit, around 1.3 % of GDP, was accumulated during the first
2 months of the year. Source: Bulgarian National Bank Monthly Information Bulletin, #7, 1997, p. 20.
24 One of the little known facts about the structure of the Bulgarian budget is that consistently over the period of
failed reforms there has been primary budget surplus, and the deficits stemmed from the heavy payments on
domestic and foreign debt. Source: Bulgarian National Bank, “Annual Report” for various years.
25 Yearly total foreign debt service hovers around 1 billion dollars in the next 7-8 years, with a peak of $1,335
billion in 2001, and then gradually falls off. Source: Andrew Kenningham, Bulgaria: Leveraging off the Deutsche
Mark (Economic Outlook and Fixed Income Investments), Merrill Lynch, July 1997.
26 Source: Andrew Kenningham, op.cit.
27 See, for example, statement by Stanley Fischer, first deputy general director of the IMF, as presented in “IMF
Approves of Monetary Policy and Sees Progress”, “Pari” daily, September 11, 1997, p. 5.
28 Total foreign investment between the beginning of 1992 and the end of July 1997 is close to $1.1 billion, of
which more than $300 million, or almost 28 %, have been invested in the first 7 months of 1997. Source: the
Foreign Investment Agency.
29 Source: NSI, Ministry of Trade and Tourism.
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cheap and more competitive on the foreign markets. In the long run, however, there is the risk of
appreciation of the German mark, and it is certain that inflation in Bulgaria will be relatively high
for at least another year, which may cause a real appreciation of the Bulgarian lev and decrease
the competitiveness of Bulgarian exports. Therefore, Bulgaria cannot rely on net exports as the
only source for long run growth. In the medium to long term perspective, Bulgaria has
opportunities for growth in several large sectors, such as construction, as a part of building the
European infrastructure, chemical industry, where the prospects are good and the foreign
investment interest is very high, foodstuffs and agricultural products, where Bulgaria is very
competitive in producing grain, canned foods, tobacco, dairy products, etc., telecommunications,
and many others. If economic activity is not disturbed by political and institutional problems and
crises, in the next 10-15 years, the Bulgarian economy has the potential to grow along the lines
outlined above, but there are some serious risks that this potential will not be realized. First,
structural reform may not be implemented swiftly, which will leave lingering problems, preserving
the high uncertainty over the next years. Second, if the new legislation and rules for doing
business are not adopted and enforced in full, transaction costs will remain high, which will hurt
production and may sway the whole economic development of the country away from the most
efficient path by creating powerful interest groups which are able to influence the political and
economic decision making processes.
In the sphere of the labor market, there will be serious problems in the next 10-15 years.
First, even if structural reform goes ahead as planned, there will be a lot of displacement of
workers when the institutions of the market economy start being enforced and firms creating
negative value added are forced to close down or restructure. Second, the Bulgarian labor force is
aging and losing qualification as the education system suffers the consequences of prolonged
economic hardship. If the Bulgarian economy is to become competitive, there will be a period of
reorientation, during which the youngest, the oldest, and the less educated and qualified workers
will not be able to adapt, while the rest of the economy will not be able to absorb, or at least
support, them. Therefore, in the near future Bulgarian unemployment will be relatively high, and
will be characterized with pockets, both geographical and demographic, of high concentration,
which will be a constant source of problems and crises. In the longer run, especially if the growth
potential of the economy is realized, the unemployment rate may drop significantly before starting
to follow a more regular cyclical pattern.
Policy Issues.
The vitality of the small scale private sector can be stimulated by creating or assisting
different programs stimulating the small business sector. In this way, since this sector does not
require heavy capital outlays before it can start expanding, both economic activity will increase,
the informal market institutions will become more firmly established at least in the business
community, and the unemployment problem will be alleviated to some degree. In this respect,
once again, the establishment and enforcement of a firm, constant, and predictable formal
institutional framework is crucial. Changes in the rules should come rarely, announced early,
discussed extensively, and their enforcement should be secured before their introduction.
Stimulation of foreign investment should not be based on differences in the treatment between
domestic and foreign investors, but on the creation of a favorable environment for any investment
activity.
With respect to unemployment, strategic decisions have to be made about the provision
of social security, unemployment benefits, education and qualification. The relatively cheap and
highly qualified and educated labor is one of the most important strategic resources of Bulgaria,
and education and qualification should be a high strategic priority in any long term economic
program.
3.5 Conclusions
With respect to the medium term, the prospects for the Bulgarian economy can be
summarized by several observations.
· The Bulgarian economy is still state dominated. The transfer of decision making powers and
responsibilities from the state to private persons will involve difficulties, conflicts, and time,
and will make the economic environment inherently unstable.
· After the deep crisis of 1996, the economy has a high growth potential and the support of the
international financial community. The introduction of a currency board will bring trust in the
economy, hard budget constraints and low inflation.
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· In the next several years, the polity will have to deal with alleviating the hardships caused by
the ongoing reform, reestablishing its ability to enforce the law, privatization, and institutional
reform, all of which will have more or less potent opposition.
· The financial system will be fragile. This will keep its ability to finance the economic growth
limited, which makes the access of Bulgarian public and private entrepreneurs to
international capital markets very important. The Bulgarian economy will be highly dependent
on international flows of goods and services, and on the movements of the German mark.
Despite the serious problems and risks, Bulgaria has all the ingredients necessary for a
sustained economic development. The crucial ingredient which remains is the persistence of a
pro-reform democratic regime.
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P A R T   F O U R:
SCENARIOS
“I can’t remember things before they happened”
Alice (in Wonderland)
Introduction
Scenario analysis often applies to strategic modeling of the political future. Approaches
to the construction of scenarios could vary greatly30. The basis of construction could be the “most
probable” or the “unthinkable” developments. The basic advantages of “scenario thinking” are
that it brings into the limelight the multitude of variants in the activities of social and political
actors; throws light on complex interrelations between various factors; and last, but not least,
engages in constructing the essential picture of the future. This makes it an important tool in the
decision-making process.
“Scenarios” practically never materialize in the way they have been constructed, yet they
are the models through which every government thinks and evaluates the perspectives of its
policy. Scenarios are not political forecasts, they are not trying to picture the most probable
developments. In the genre of  warning paper scenarios attempt to picture the most probable
risky developments.
The five scenarios which are “played out” in the proposed analysis are certainly not five
distinctive histories of the future. Quite often the “materialization” of a specific scenario becomes
a premise for the emergence of the next one. What makes up the unity of the five scenarios is that
each one of them is hiddenly, implicitly present in the current situation.
All of the scenarios are constructed in a similar way. There is always a ”story”, an
analysis of the factors increasing the probability of the “imagined” developments and risk-
avoiding strategy. The five scenarios are divided into two families. The “chaos family” includes the
scenarios “Kosovo”, “Kozlodouy” and “Tirana”, all of which construct models of total disintegration
of the social infrastructure. The “dangerous family” includes the “isolationist” and “Mexican
scenarios”, which are in their essence not scenarios of state collapse and social disintegration
but represent developments leading to such collapse. The major characteristics which distinct
the five models of the future are:
· the source of political instability they suggest /”Kosovo” and “Mexican” scenarios are
constructed around external threat; the others are shaped around internal threat/
· the identity of political and social actors that dominate each scenario/Mexican scenario is a
“failure” of the reformers, “isolationist” scenario is dominated by anti-reformist forces/;
· the type of social project they advance/”Mexican” scenario is aiming at the marketization of
social life and public policies, “isolationist” scenario is aiming at preserving the interventionist
state/
There are three main presumptions for outlining the different scenarios.
The first is that Bulgaria has shown symptoms of the “weak state” in the last seven
years. Bulgaria’s economy is the worst performing postcommunist economy in Europe31, which
has failed to produce any sustainable economic growth 32, the country failed to keep the
agreements with the IMF, and became the object of humanitarian assistance in  the beginning of
1997.
The second assumption is that Southeastern Europe displays features of a risky region.
The Dayton Accords promoted the situation of no-war, but failed to promote peace in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, according to respected analysts Kosovo remains the source of regional instability33,
                                                                
30 See Wack Pierre, “Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead”, Harvard Business Review, 63:5, Nov-Dec, 1985. See
Wack Pierre, “Shooting the Rapids”, Harvard Business Review, 63:5, Nov-Dec, 1985. See Yergin, D., Gustatson,
T., Russia 2010 and What it means for the Word, Cambridge Energy Research Associates Report. (Random
House 1993, 1994).
31 See Part Three.
32 See Part Three.
33 RAND Papers.
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there are symptoms of increasing internal instability in Serbia and Macedonia34, Albania is on the
road of institutional recovery but the risks remain high.
The third presumption is that there is a high level of individual insecurity among the
majority of Bulgarians. This insecurity is associated not with fears of geopolitical character35, the
majority of people are not afraid of war, but there is a rising fear of unemployment, of crime and
the inefficiency of welfare system /health care, pensions, etc./.
(A) “Chaos Family”
The “chaos” scenarios are the nightmare that every politician attempts to avoid. It could
be provoked either by foreign events and factors or by internal ones.
The distinct features of these scenarios are: incapability of the legitimately elected
government to exercise power and control over the country’s territory, a high degree of social
disintegration, massive violation of the civil rights of the population, unchecked violence, supply
crisis, and necessity for humanitarian or military intervention.
The state collapse in Albania (though relatively brief, Spring of 1997), as well as certain
symptoms of institutional paralysis during the winter crisis in Bulgaria, 1996-1997, make us
believe that the ground for the scenarios of “chaos” should be carefully examined.
The determining factors leading to such a scenario are:
· Erosion of the social support for the legitimate government and a drastic decrease in the
standard of living of the majority of people (Przeworski contends that a democracy is not very likely
to survive at a per capita income below $1000); GDP per capita in Bulgaria in 1995 was $ 1537
based on the lev-dollar exchange rate, or $ 4071 based on the purchasing power parity method36
and the support for the government during the winter crisis reached 7%37.
· Corrupted and incompetent public administration; Public polls indicate that the public is
perceiving the government as corrupted and the inefficiency of the state administration according
to the present government is at a dangerous level.
· Intensification of the ethnic and religious tensions on regional or national level (decline in living
standards and regionalization of poverty can erupt in ethnic strife;
· Lack of political nerve on the side of the U.S. and of the EU to follow a policy of involvement
towards Southeastern Europe.
Depending on the cause of destabilization, in the framework of the large “chaos” family one could
differentiate three chaotic scenarios:
4.1 The Kosovo Scenario
Collision between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. A sovereign “Republic of Kosovo” is
declared. Massive invasion of Serbian troops in Kosovo. A wave of ethnic fighting and outrage in
Macedonia. Subsequent influx of Macedonians and Albanians into Bulgaria. Clashes at the
border claim dozens of victims. Indecisiveness on the side of UN and NATO which are reluctant
to send troops to Kosovo. UN troops in Macedonia are blocked in their peace keeping functions
(they are insufficient in number). The Macedonian government invites, or insists on having,
assistance from Belgrade to help manage with the Albanian uprisings. Serbian troops enter
Macedonia. Political crisis in Sofia ...
A number of similar strategic analyses which hinge upon the likelihood of a “third Balkan
war” were proposed following the eruption of the Yugoslav war. Most interpret a possible spill-
over of the Kosovo crisis against the backdrop of the pre-war history of the region and claim that a
new conflict between Balkan states is very likely.
What distinguishes the current developments from the Balkan wars at the turn of the
century is that the participants are not young and aggressive nation-states which aim at territorial
enlargement or national liberation. Rather, they are weak post-communist states of ethnically and
                                                                
34 Materials of the Conference “Towards Stability on the Balkan Peninsula”, June 6-8, 1997.
35 According to Gallup Survey, only 14% expect to be involved in a war in the near future.
36 Sources: National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, Statisticheski Spravochnik (Statistical Reference Annual),
1997; Bulgaria. Human development Report, 1997. (Sofia: UNDP, 1997).
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socially divided societies. Thus, the Kosovo scenario does not represent a traditional war, but a
model for destabilization in Southeastern Europe. This destabilization affects the ethnic and
cultural boundaries within the region, rather than state borders per se. This scenario implies a
transformation of the region into a great Bosnia and threatens Bulgaria’s territorial integrity.
Below is a discussion of the major factors influencing the probability of such a scenario.
The last several months have witnessed a re-positioning in the Kosovar shadow
government. The moderate faction of Rugova is challenged by more radical groups. Rugova is
openly challenged by Bujar Bukosi/prime minister in exile of the Republic of Kosovo/, and by one
of the leaders of his own Democratic League of Kosovo - Adem Demaci/leader of the
parliamentary faction of the party/. The increasing support for the illegal Kosovo Liberation Army
indicates that radical factions are gaining importance. The success of the militant factions will
increase the risk for clashes in Kosovo.
After the political crisis in Serbia which resulted in the acceptance of the opposition
victory in the 1996 local elections, the political situation in Serbia is marked by three major events.
(1) Milosevic was elected President of a new Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); (2) the
opposition disintegrated, opening room for the Socialist presidential candidate to win the coming
presidential elections and (3) Milosevic and his supporters confronted the international
community directly, by siding with Karadjic in the conflict in the Republika Srpska. All these
developments in Serbia suggest that an anti-Albanian campaign targeting Kosovo can be used to
mobilize public support for the endangered Milosevic regime.
In addition, recent developments in Macedonia support the hypothesis that political risk
will increase in the region. (1) The country is in a state of overall economic collapse. (2) The
VMRO (DPMN) opposition radicalized its criticism against President Gligorov. (3) The state of
Gligorov’s health raises fears that the stability of this newly sovereign state depends on the
personal charisma and networks of the incumbent President. (4) The collapse of the Albanian
state enforced the process of illegal immigration of Albanians into Macedonia. (5) A lot of
weapons were trafficked from Albania to Macedonia.
The political debate in the United States, the major guarantor for the stability of
Macedonia, increases the probability for risky developments. Congress continues to pressure
President Clinton to stand by his commitment and withdraw American troops from Bosnia in
1998. This is an indication that the US decision-making elite is unwilling to support further
involvement in the Balkans. At the same time, the record of the European powers in efficient crisis
prevention is not convincing. Germany /the major European power/ because of historical reasons
is especially unsuitable to assume moderating functions.38
All these factors make "Kosovo" a probable scenario for the political future. Should the
Kosovo scenario materialize under the present socio-economic circumstances, it would
endanger Bulgaria through the risk of (1) military clashes on the border with Macedonia; (2) the
influx of refugees which will cause great difficulties for the economy and social infrastructure; (3)
emergence of a major new division in public life*39 which will undermine the existing consensus;
and subsequently, (4) conditions for tensions on ethnic and religious basis.
Risk Avoiding Strategy
Many factors can increase or reduce the probability of the Kosovo scenario. For the
Bulgarian government, the promotion of political stability in Macedonia is key to any prudent risk-
avoiding strategy. In the context of the present Bulgarian-Macedonian relations, there are three
most promising short-term policies:
(a) Bulgaria ought to insist on a continuing American (under UN auspices) military
presence in Macedonia;
(b) Bulgaria ought to insist on changes in the Macedonian position concerning the
Macedonian minority in Bulgaria;
(c) Bulgaria ought to go beyond the language dispute in its relations with Macedonia,
accepting the right of Macedonians to call their language as they wish, while at the same time
insisting on:
- A declaration on the acceptance of the existing borders;
- The establishment of a free trade zone;
                                                                
38 Senior officials and journalists in Macedonia have stressed on many occasions that Bulgaria was Germany's
ally in the WW II.
39 Political instability in Macedonia will re-shape the public debate in Bulgaria. Today Bulgarian public debate is
structured around the issue of economic reforms, risky developments in Macedonia will put security issue on the
agenda and the society will be divided in its opinion on Bulgaria's role in the Macedonian crisis.
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- Free cross-border circulation of publications and books;
- Realization of the agreed infrastructure projects (enumeration);
- Encouragement of investment between the two countries.
(d) Bulgaria ought to adopt an integration strategy vis-a-vis NATO and EU, which stresses
the significance of Macedonian integration into these structures.
4.2 The Kozloduy Scenario
This scenario implies a
destabilization of the country as a result of a significant ecological disaster or industrial accident.
The hypothetical nuclear accident in the nuclear power plant “Kozloduy” is a model of such a
crisis. An accident of this kind would lead to a massive destruction of the country. But this
scenario is not focused on the potential risk of the Kozloduy nuclear power station. The
technological risk reducing policies are presented in several international papers.
The “Kozloduy” scenario brings to light two significant risk factors in the region’s post-
communist countries: one is the lack of technological control on the side of the government on
the technologically old and dangerous productions and, two, the incapacity of the government to
act efficiently in a state of emergency. The “weak” state, which is among the major
presuppositions for the scenario “chaos” as a whole, does not imply an efficient crisis-
management. An ecological disaster or a big industrial accident can lead to destabilization
because on the eve of the “chaos” the state suffers from an advanced stage of institutional
paralysis. The reaction of a series of Bulgarian governments shows that an ecological
catastrophe or accident can accelerate existing processes of disintegration and collapse.
According to the State Commission on Emergencies 90 enterprises from the energy
sector and chemical industry are pointed out as sources of major risks. The figures prove that the
number of technological accidents and of their victims is increasing (See Appendix Two).
Major factors increasing the risk for technological accidents are;
· Outdated technologies (the industrialization of Bulgaria took place mainly in the 60s and 70s);
· The lack of investment.
· The general crisis in the society and the decline of the technological discipline;
· The fact that technologically underdeveloped sectors are highly unionized, which makes them
politically powerful and prevents closing of the dangerous enterprises.
Risk Avoiding Strategy
In the situation when there are no available funds for the investment in the safety of the
enterprises, and the when the fear of unemployment prevents radical measures on the side of
the government, two policies are of great importance
(1)  in the privatization deals investments in safety have to become priorities
(2)  a public awareness campaign has to be undertaken by the government and the
NGOs directed at "dangerous sector" at the local level.
3.3 Tirana Scenario
The closing down of large yet loss-making enterprises and the impossibility of alternative
employment in entire regions causes starvation unrest, massive refusal to pay taxes, robbery of
warehouses and stores, as well as a significant wave of anti-social behavior. The low producer
prices of regionally important agricultural products (as is the tobacco in the ethnically mixed
regions) become a reason for the destabilization of the regions with mixed population. Local
strikes and civil disobedience take place in the different parts of the country. The government in
Sofia in practice loses control over some regions. Protesters refuse to talk both to the government
and opposition. National trade union leaders are not allowed by the people to come to the
protesting regions. Parliament asks the European Union to negotiate with the protesters.
The “Tirana” development is generated by internal cataclysms; its cause is the
disintegration of the social infrastructure. Such destabilization could be provoked by activities
either of a reformist or anti-reformist government. Essentially, the “Tirana” scenario presents a
collapse of statehood. It comes about as a result of the government’s incapability to cope with the
Explosion in the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant.
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socio-economic and socio-political conflicts, as well as to neutralize potential agents of
destabilization. Thus the Tirana scenario is the manifestation of the "weak state".
Major factors increasing the risk of "Tirana Scenario" are :
(1)  the introduction of the Currency Board ; (2) the regional character of the
unemployment; (3) the strength of the organized crime; (4) the weak opposition.
(1) The Introduction of the Currency Board in Bulgaria on July 1, 1997 radically re-shapes the
policy environment. The Currency Board will result in the drastic cuts in public spending and the
corresponding rise in unemployment. According to various sources the unemployment will rise
by 3-4 percentage points 40. The unemployed are going to come mostly from the public
administration and the closure of loss-making enterprises. If the restrictions imposed by the
Currency Board are not compensated by the creation of new jobs it is probable that the social
infrastructure of some regions in the country will collapse. The Currency Board can be
destabilized also through the tendency of stagflation which can be noticed in Bulgaria in the
summer of 1997. Inflation in the first months of the Currency Board which was higher than the
expected one was due to the devaluation of the Deutsche mark, the control exercised by criminal
structures on the food market and the rise of the prices due to the limited consumption. If the
government does not manage to reduce the 2% monthly inflation, the Currency Board may get
under pressure, and its failure will increase the risk of total destabilization.
(2) Unemployment is a crucial factor for the probability of risky developments not so much
because of the general number of the unemployed people but because the distribution of the
unemployment. According to the present figures even now the unemployment in some of the
mountain regions is reaching 80%. The black market and family farming cannot compensate the
closure of the major regional enterprises. So it can be expected that in certain regions people will
be unable to pay for heat and electricity. Socially motivated protests seem very probable. It is also
important to underline that the Trade Unions are stronger in the loss-making enterprises.
According to trade union sources - the strongest unions are the ones of the workers from  the
metallurgy and mining industry.  There is one more important specific feature of the structure of
Bulgarian unemployment. Bulgaria is the country in Eastern Europe where the number of people
who are out of work for more than one year is greatest /OECD/. This figure indicates the
emergence of an underclass, which is the potential agent for Tirana scenario.
Organized crime is the other major factor increasing the probability of the Tirana
scenario. Criminal structures can become the major factor for the destabilization. According to the
Ministry of Interior the criminal structures are most powerful in the border regions, and in the
Black Sea coast area. One of the result of the embargo was the internationalization of the criminal
activities. The inefficiency  of the local police and the judiciary combined with the government's
anti-crime policies can provoke collapse. On the one side the present government is committed
to fight corruption, on the other some of the local law enforcement structures are corrupted, and
this combination makes the risk for the Tirana scenario higher.
The weak opposition is also a factor increasing the risk of the Tirana scenario. The weak
opposition /which is the case with the socialists  now/ affects the probability of the catastrophic
developments by (a) not presenting alternative to the status quo; (b) depriving the government
from an opponent with whom it can negotiate solutions; ( c ) by localizing the conflicts. The lack of
a credible national opponent of the government strengthens the local character of the opposition.
A more careful analysis of the political crisis in Bulgaria at the beginning of 1997 leads
to the following two conclusions. First, a new socio-political crisis in Bulgaria would more likely
be a series of local conflicts with high intensity rather than a general political protest headed by
the opposition. And, second, the centers of such a crisis would be outside of the capital  Sofia
and of the other large cities, Varna and Plovdiv. In this regard, the most risky are the regions
where the enterprises of the military industrial complex (MIC) are located (because of the
weapons spread around among the people) and the regions with a mixed population, because of
the potential for the religious or ethnic development of the conflict.
The danger of a “Tirana” type of destabilisation increases because of the existing
tension between the central and the local authorities. At present most of the local councils are
dominated by BSP majorities and the central power is UDF controlled.
Risk Avoiding Strategy
The reduction of the risk for the Tirana scenario depends on the overall policy of the
government and especially on its success to create an efficient safety net for the "losers" of the
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reforms. But in the political perspectives the major policies which can reduce the risk of the
Tirana scenario are three.
(1)  The first one is the adoption of the Early Warning system, which can help the
government craft preventive policies based on the objective information for the level
of the risk in the different parts of the country. Early Warning System has to be
located outside the administration.
(2)  Second policy   to be recommended is the empowerment of the local governments.
Powerful local governments have better potential for the "Tirana" preventive policy
than the national government. The law for Local Self-governance has to be among
the priorities of the Parliament
(3)  The third element in the risk-avoiding strategy is the strengthening and
encouragement of the network of charity and community organizations. The civil
social network can take on some of the responsibilities of the state and make the
transition bearable for the population. So tax breaks for the charities and for the
community foundations have to be introduced.
4.4 Remark: When is “Chaos” Possible?
Bulgaria’s regional policy is not a source of destabilization. However, the high degree of
internal instability makes Bulgaria an easy victim of an “imported” instability. Every development
of a crisis in the ethnic or socio-economic situation in the region relates directly to Bulgaria’s
security condition.
The success or failure in building an adequate system of social security is the other
great challenge. A wrong sequence of  reform measures or an absence of account for the factor
“criminalization” could provoke irreversible social cataclysms.
However, there are a series of factors that make the “chaos” scenario less probable.
The most important are:
· The presence of UN troops in Bosnia, Macedonia and Albania, the fear of destabilization,
characteristic  not only of the governments in the region but also of the great majority of
opposition and ethnic leaders;
· The experience which international organizations, and the international community in general,
gained in crisis prevention. At present, for instance, one could expect that the World Bank, the IMF,
and the EU would be partners of the Bulgarian government in ensuring the acceptance of the
social cost of the reforms;
· The stability and general capability of the democratic institutions demonstrated in the winter
crisis of 1997 lowers the danger of total destabilization;
· The Kostov government activities against the structures of the organized crime also contribute
to diminish the risk of a “chaos” scenario;
To sum up, the “chaos” scenarios are unlikely yet not impossible for Bulgaria’s political
future. The imaginary state of chaos could last indefinitely long. But even a brief passage through
“chaos” would put a durable mark on society’s political culture and on its political institutions. It
would also at least put off Bulgaria’s integration into the EU with a generation. The “chaos”
development would strengthen the emigration attitude of the active part of the population. It would
make Bulgaria dependent on various international organizations’ programs for assistance. The
materialization even of separate elements of the total collapse scenario will cancel Bulgaria’s
national label from the list of the countries which are attractive for investors.
(B) “Danger Family”
The “Danger Family” consists of two scenarios. The “isolationist scenario” explores the
probability and sustainability of an anti-reformist regime oriented towards state interventionism
and based on the support of the “disappointed majority”. The “Mexican scenario” explores the
dangers for the radically reform minded government oriented towards opening the economy and
promotion of pro-investment policies. Both scenarios are not scenarios of collapse but the
avoidance of the “isolationist regime” and the minimization of the “tequila risks” are at the center
of the successful reform policy.
4.5 “Isolation” Scenario
The harshness of reforms erodes the public support for them and a new populist
government comes to power with a program to defend the national interests. Statutes protecting
the Bulgarian producers are passed, privatization is stopped and deliberate actions against
foreign investors begin. Under populist slogans for protecting both producers and consumers,
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heavy involvement of the state in economic decision making is reintroduced. Bulgaria unilaterally
refuses to continue servicing its foreign debt and the international financial community withdraws
its support.
The isolationist policy could result either from an attempt to prevent “chaos scenarios” or
from a failure of a “Mexican scenario.” Isolationism is a perpetual threat to the country’s political
development in the next 15 years.
Essential features of the isolationist scenario are the orientation of the economic and
political life toward the state and its major institutions, a regulated market, heavily protected from
foreign competition, a centralization of power, a higher degree of populism and nationalism in
society, a restriction on civil rights.
The analysis of the political processes in Eastern Europe during the last 7 years
demonstrates that the establishment of an isolationist regime is more often than not a result of a
failure of the liberal reforms. In their essence, such regimes present a consolidation of the old
elites.41 In Latin America analogous regimes are characterized by strong elements of
authoritarian rule and a significant participation of the military in the political life.
The most important presupposition for materializing the isolationist scenario in Bulgaria
are as follows:
· Decrease of the standard of living of significant portions of the population and disappointment
in democracy and the market; According to OECD income in Bulgaria in the period 1989-1995
has fallen 50%. In the end of 1994 when BSP came to power, 54% of the population declared that
the country was on the wrong track and that "before" was better than now.
· The state paternalistic tradition and the nostalgia toward the communist state social security;
· Increase in unemployment by 3-4 percentage points due to the implementation of reforms, and
continuing decline in output;
· The demographic tendency toward aging and the enlarged number of state dependent
groups 42;
· Undeveloped market mechanisms and the existence of local monopolies due to the weakness
of the state;
· Refusal to accept and resistance against foreign investment (it is important to note at this point
that the smaller and more symbolic the part of the foreign capital in a local economy the stronger
the anti-investment feelings);
· Lack of will on the part of the EU countries to carry out an active policy of integrating Bulgaria
and Southeastern Europe; Bulgaria's remaining out of the first wave of NATO and EU
enlargements indicates the tendency of the NATO and EU to treat Southeastern Europe as a
region with secondary importance.
· The public support for the stronger hand and quick victory over crime and corruption; Gallup
indicates that in the end of 1996, 70% of the BSP supporters in the end of 1996 saw the
upholding of civil rights as an obstacle to a successful anti-crime campaign
· The emergence of an anti-West regional “super power” (Russia, Turkey). The risk of realization
of the isolationist scenario will increase if the two potential superpowers of the region decide to
follow anti-western policies. The isolationist regime in Bulgaria will become much more probable
if Russia changes its foreign policy orientation.
Economically, the “isolationist regime” would demonstrate itself through imposing
protectionist measures (increase of the import taxes, preferential treatment of various sectors of
the national economy, raise in the burdens imposed on foreign investors). Under an isolationist
regime important policies will include: selective treatment of foreign investors, attempts at
domination over the private sector (through tax policies and forms of confiscation), use of the
state banks as sources of subsidies for loss-making state enterprises, restriction of the scope of
privatization and tolerance for the state sector.
The policy of isolationism has an anti-reformist character but does not present a form of
restoring the “ancient regime.”
Such a policy could rely on a social support in the short run. The very practice shows that
during the first 1-3 years of its establishment the isolationist regime leads to economic growth,
                                                                
41 Meciars’s regime in Slovakia is a good illustration of this tendency.
42 Between 1990 and 1995 the dependency ratio (the ratio between the number of pensioners to the number of
contributors to the pension funds) increases from 55.1 % to 89 %. Source: OECD, “Bulgaria 1997, Economic
Survey”.
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growth of export, decrease of unemployment. It also has successes in fighting crime. In the long
run, however, the isolationist type of regime lacks the resources for providing sustainable
economic development.
The weakest side of such a regime is the character of the social forces that give it
support. The latter is rooted in the majority’s anti-reformist feelings, as well as in the interests of
the state administration, of the state enterprises’ management, of the national capital and its
protectionist attitude and of the populist attitude of certain political leaders.
Politically, the Bulgarian version of an isolationist regime has the following five distinct
features:
· Power centralization and domination of the executive branch (a charismatic leader);
· Decreasing role of the National Assembly (the parliament) and restriction of civil rights. The
majoritarian rule replaces the consensus in the decision-making process;
· Restriction of the rights of the opposition, the civic organisations and the free press;
· Enhancement of the role of the army and the police (powerful media campaign for the necessity
of an uncompromising  war against crime);
· Increase of the role of the nationalist rhetoric and anti-minority feelings in social life (anti-Roma
campaign most probable).
In Latin America’s political practice, as well as in other countries of South Europe until
the 80s, isolationist regimes set themselves up after military intervention in the political life. In
Bulgaria such a development is less probable. It is also highly improbable to have any kind of
classic authoritarian regime established and free elections abolished. A possible scenario of
imposing an “isolationist” regime includes an overwhelming election victory of a populist party
(often but not necessary “leftist”), a consolidation of the anti-reformist social majority, an isolation
of the pro-western political and economic elite.
It is not ruled out that moderate reformist governments transform themselves into
isolationist. In this sense “protectionism” is a temptation of every government. And, different
governments could have “isolationist periods,” as was the case with Videnov’s government at the
beginning of their mandate. If one should look for a demarcation line between “moderate” and
“hard” isolationism, one should note that as a rule the “hard isolationism” would announce a
moratorium on the foreign debt’s payments and would interrupt, or at least “freeze,” the relations
with the WB and the IMF.
In the field of foreign policy, an isolationist regime would be covertly or openly anti-
western and would revert Bulgaria toward Russia. In its regional policy it would replace the
strategy of integration by a balance of powers. With a high degree of probability it would be anti-
Islamic but would hardly be ready to run into adventurous activities.
Risk Avoiding Strategy
The risk avoiding strategies against the establishment of an isolationist regime in
Bulgaria are as follows:
· Increase in the openness of the Bulgarian economy by decreasing barriers and by integrating in
the European and world markets;
· Diversification of the import of raw materials and capital aimed at avoiding dependence on one
source;
· The protection and development of the democratic institutions and the stimulation of the
mechanisms of the civil society;
· The completion of privatization, which will decrease the potential support for an isolationist
regime;
· The continuation of pro-western reforms, policies and orientation by the country’s ruling elite.
On the political level the two  major policies  for the avoidance of the isolationist regime:
(1)  The success of the administrative reform undertaken by present government, which will
erode the social base of the isolationist takeover.
(2)  The diversification of the import of raw materials. Bulgaria has to make an attempt to have
more than one supplier of oil, gas and nuclear fuel. From this perspective the development of
the gas pipe project with Gazprom and Burgas-Alexandropulus oil pipe have to be balanced
with the construction of the Burgas-Dures pipeline.
4.6 THE TEQUILA SCENARIO
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Year 2000 - due to widespread social discontent the presidential elections in Russia are
won by a hard-line communist.  Plans for a complete turnaround in Russia’s economic and
foreign policies are immediately announced: suspension of privatization plans; re-nationalization
of strategic industries (banking, oil and gas, etc.); introduction of severe capital controls; revision
of Russia’s agreements with the World Bank and IMF; tying economic cooperation and trade with
neighboring countries to Russia’s political demands (anti-NATO and EU).
Markets react instantaneously: investors in Russian treasury and corporate securities
rush to unload these holdings and prices fall sharply; paper issued by Central and East European
countries, although at a smaller scale, loses value too.  Confidence in the entire region’s
economic and political future is shattered.
The Bulgarian ripples 1) A forthcoming debt issue by Gazprom to further finance its
Bulgarian gas-transportation project has to be scrapped.  As a result, the project, in its second
stage of construction, must be frozen temporarily. Around $ 450 million of investments made, one
third of which loaned by Bulgarian banks, are thus tied up for an indefinite period of time with no
clear prospects for repayment.  Bulgaria’s access to low-cost energy for industrial and household
needs is postponed. 2) Two large Russian banks holding stakes in Bulgarian counterparts
are threatened by nationalization. Depositors in the two Bulgarian  banks rush to withdraw their
money creating a systemic risk for the entire banking sector.  3) Portfolio investors in Bulgarian
domestic securities sell and repatriate  huge amounts of capital. The Central Bank’s foreign
exchange reserves plummet. The currency board rules mandate that the money supply must be
contracted accordingly.
The scenario constructed in this analysis is called “Tequila” scenario because it is
characteristic for the current stage of globalization and its mechanism was best demonstrated by
the well-known Mexican peso crisis of December 1994. This scenario is “universal” for the
political development of emerging markets.
This scenario is a model of economic collapse, financial chaos and political crisis
following a period of economic boom. The Tequila scenario is a model of across the board
market deregulation and abrupt withdrawal of the government from the economy in a situation
where there is no social basis for reforms, absence of stable democracy and lack of economic
culture of the citizens all of which otherwise could in principle guarantee the sustainability of the
economic growth.
The isolationist scenario is an attempt of the anti-reform majority to closely control the
process of economic and political development of the country.  In contrast, the Tequila scenario is
an attempt for dictate by a reform-minded minority.  The aspiration of the pro-Western political
elite to overcome the lags in the process of market reforms make this scenario possible for
Bulgaria.
Some of the major factors that will make such a scenario more probable can be
summarized as follows:
· Non-diversified economic relations with the rest of the world - continuing economic (fuel -
nuclear, oil and gas; raw materials; export trade) dependence on a small number of partners,
most notably Russia, characterised by potentially unstable political regimes.  Continuing to
import most of its energy sources - nuclear fuel (generating some forty per cent of the
country’s power supply), oil, gas - from Russia, Bulgaria remains hostage of political
attitudes, priorities,  and uncertainties there.  On a few occasions over the last seven years
Bulgaria faced winter energy crises due to disrupted supplies from such sources.
· Failure to implement rapid structural economic reforms that would bring and keep in the
country a large number of strategic investors in multiple sectors of the economy.  At present,
the limited amount of long-term foreign investment capital in Bulgaria and the liberal capital
controls make the national economy particularly sensitive to quick capital outflows resulting
from liquidated portfolio investments.
· Absence of a developing small- and medium-size business sector providing some level of
flexibility to the national economy
· Existence of a pro-restoration, pro-isolationist political alternative such as the hard-line faction
within the Bulgarian Socialist Party
· Investors’ non-confidence due to, among other things, the government’s lack of a solid track
record of consistent support for liberal economic reforms.  Even sporadic and otherwise
unimportant actions by the government may cause investors to question its commitment to
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free market principles and practices - for example, the government-led, summer 1997
campaign against “grain and milk speculators”.
Politically, the “Mexican regime” is tolerant to democracy and its institutions but it is
clearly elitist in nature. The basis of this regime is constituted by the business establishment, the
young and educated generation, and the foreign investors. At the same time, this regime is
hostile to local government and civil participation, reducing the role of the civil society to free
entrepreneurial activities.
Risk avoiding strategies
Key measures whose prompt or ongoing implementation will help avoid or at least
minimize the adverse consequences of a tequila scenario for Bulgaria:
· Worldwide diversification of Bulgaria’s economic ties with an emphasis on politically stable
countries as partners.
· Policy of aggressively seeking and attracting as investors world leaders in the respective
industries whose presence in Bulgaria can provide, apart from capital, more valuable long-
term benefits - state-of-the-art technologies, education, business skills, knowledge,
reputation.
· Good cooperation with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund which will: 1)
reinforce investors’ confidence in the country; 2) facilitate quick access to emergency
financing, if need be.
· A stable legal framework geared toward already announced, long-term economic objectives
· An administrative reform which, among other things, will reformulate the role of the
administration at all levels from one of imposing solutions to one of negotiating them within
the frame of the law.
· Active involvement of businesses regardless of their nationality in policy design and decision-
making at the central and regional levels
· Creation of mechanisms to manage conflicts/disagreements between businesses and the
administration.
Policy Recommendations
1.  Bulgaria’s government would be well advised to discontinue the so far existing, politically-
motivated polarization of the country’s foreign economic relations, and promote intensive
trade and investment with countries from Europe, North America, Southeast Asia, other than
the traditional partners - Russia, Germany, Japan.
2.  A special effort must be made to identify and attract high-quality foreign investors in key
sectors of the economy - finance, telecommunications, transportation, energy, technologies.
In the context of privatization, this can be done by selecting buyers based on their overall
business profile and prospects rather than the bid price only.
3.  The government should work for eliminating real pro-restoration political alternatives and
expanding the political and social support for needed reforms by allying with reformist groups
and individuals regardless of their political color.
4.7 Bulgaria: Facing the Risk
In the genre of a “warning paper” the success scenario is not a picture of the future, but
rather a model how to avoid the failure of the reforms or a model of how to avert the political and
social destabilization of the country, the establishment of an isolationist regime, or the risk of a
radical liberalization without social basis.
The challenge in principle is how to combine a growing competitive economy based on
market principles with the development of democracy in the country.
The analysis of the political risk Bulgaria will face in the coming ten-fifteen years is not a
manual with risk reducing policies. The very nature of the risks the country is facing pre-
determine that the major challenge to our security will be the way we think about security.
Since 1989, the year in which the Cold War ended, more than four million people were
killed in the world and more than 100 violent conflicts have taken place. Most of them were
intrastate conflicts. The internal instability or what we defined as "weak state" becomes the major
source of conflict. So, the problem which we want to address in the conclusion of our paper is to
what extent the National Security Doctrine which was adopted in 1995 can provide a framework
for preventive diplomacy and risk avoiding policies.
In our view the Security Doctrine fails to address the new threats. And the major reason
for its failure is the fact that it is state-oriented  and territory-oriented. The obsession with
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sovereignty and territory explains security in the terms of borders and population. But the threats
Bulgaria is facing are not confined to the protection of the borders and population. The challenge
to the Bulgaria's security today is the crisis of governability, the failure of the legitimate
government to implement its policies. The threat is not war but disintegration, so in order to
address this challenge Bulgaria needs a new Security Doctrine. Misperception of the risk is, too,
a risk increasing factor.
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ANNEX ONE
Crisis Experience: the New Style Behavior
From 1986 to the present (august 1997) Bulgarian society
passed trough three very serious political crises, of which
two originated at home and one abroad; in all three cases the
scenarios that entailed violence were not vindicated. If we
throw in the expectations for violent score-settling in the
aftermath of the elections of 1991, 1994 and 1997, which were
also disproved by reality, we begin to see violence as a
factor that has been practically excluded from the recent
democratic development of Bulgaria. It makes sense to briefly
sketch the ways in which violence was avoided in the most
serious instances.
(a) Crisis of December 1989 -J anuary 1990
The first crisis was the most dangerous, as it combined
power transition, change of  the nature of power itself, and
ethno-cultural conflict with foreign ramifications. The
opposition groups that appeared in Bulgaria in 1986 were of
two types: re-active (mainly ethnic Turks who wanted the
“ restoration”  of their birth-names - of which they had been
deprived in a state-enforced campaign in 1984-5), and pro-
active (mainly ethnic Bulgarians who wanted a general
democratization of the regime). Despite several repressive
acts of varying degree against both types of groups (there
were a few casualties among the Turks), the regime did not
even attempt to use violence in order to defend the status quo
- and it did have plenty of  opportunity to do so. This
attitude led to the bloodless coup of November 1989, which
catered to the demands of the ethnic majority members for
democratization; a month and a half later the minority
members’ demands were met also, for their names were
“ restored” . In this way the reformer communists  managed to
separate in time the two jobs: that of  power transfer and
that of inter-ethnic normalization. The third job - that of
the nature of political power was approached very gradually,
without letting public opinion develop a fixation over it; the
reformer rulers managed to mesmerize society into believing
that “ all will be well”  in this matter (democratic
legitimization of political power) - and, in fact, things did
get well following the Round Table talks and the congress that
renamed “ Socialist”  the extant Bulgarian Communist Party.
However, a month and a half proved too short a period to
separate effectively the power problems from the ethnic ones;
hence the anti-minority reaction of many ethnic Bulgarians
from ethnically mixed regions, who were promptly organized by
local communist party bosses and shipped to the capital in a
general protest action. The situation came to a head when
ethnic minority groups confronted the majority groups on
Parliament square. It is remarkable, that this crisis was
managed in a classical democratic style: all parties with a
stake in the issue agreed to send representatives to an ad hoc
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“ Civic Committee on the National Question” , facilitated by
the Chairman of Parliament, and after a four-day debate that
Committee recognized the fait accompli of the name restoration
- which ended the acute phase of the crisis.
(b) The Crisis of  the first quarter of 1992
The second serious crisis was foreign-born and relatively
simpler, as there was only one problem: the independence of
Macedonia; simplicity was balanced by the fact that, given a
negative development, it could have resulted in a new Balkan
war. In the beginning of 1992 the European Union recognized
the independence of Slovenia and Croatia; Bulgaria was more
drastic, as it became the first country in the world to
recognize also Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. For Bulgaria
- and the Balkans - Macedonia was the hottest issue; it was
feared that a Serbian occupation of Macedonia was coming ,to
prevent secession; in such a case Bulgaria, officially or not,
would have intervened militarily too. The Bulgarian demarche
with the unprompted recognition of Macedonia intended to show
that it had no aspirations towards Macedonia and that its
position should not be used as an excuse for a possible
Serbian occupation. Simultaneously, the powerful traditional
irredentist Macedonian lobby in Bulgaria was perplexed and
weakened by the ambiguous statement that Bulgaria recognized
indeed the Macedonian state, but it “ did not recognize the
Macedonian nation” . The net result was that a historic source
of tension on the Peninsula was liquidated at a minimal price
in a purely political way; today, despite still open disputes
over the Macedonian language and such like, nobody in the
region really believes that Bulgaria could start a military
aggression against its new Western neighbor.
(c) The Crisis of December 1996 - January 1997
The third was a crisis of governance. As a result of the
exceptionally bad governance of the BSP executive, small
groups of people began public demonstrations in the capital in
December 1996; they were joined by numerous students, and
after the opposition decided to head and organize protests,
the situation started resembling the on-going Belgrade daily
marches. The crisis reached its peak when a large part of
Bulgaria cities followed suit, and a bloody clash with the
police took place in Sofia (with injuries on both sides, but
no deaths). In this situation the BSP could have held on to
power - but only at the expense of an escalation of police
brutality, which could have triggered off armed clashes
throughout the land. At this junction  BSP decided to hand
power over to the democratic opposition, relinquishing the
constitutional chances it still had. Thus, under civic and
political pressure, power was given to those, who were
supposed to furnish the country with a better government
(actually those hopes came true); escalation of violence was
avoided while all constitutional procedure was strictly
adhered to.
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We can infer that in all crisis situations after 1986 the
Bulgarian political class had the option of violence, and
despite the appeal of short-term gains refused to pay  the
price of social disruption and/or international repercussions.
A new style of compromise and flexibility, excluding violence,
has been established; its inertia would prbably hold over the
next 10-15 years.
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ANNEX TWO
Bulgaria’s Democracy: Comparative Perspective
In 1997 Freedom House published the results of the ”Nations in Transit 1997” survey of 25
post-communist countries/all Balkan countries with the exception of new Yugoslavia and Bosna-
Herzegovina are included/. The survey covers the democratic and economic performances of the
countries in Central Europe, Southeatern Europe and the New Independent States till December 31,
1996. Constructing a scale ranging from 1 to 7/most to least liberal/ Freedom House rates the
countries in their progress in democratic and economic reforms. ”The Nations in Transit 1997” survey
is an excellent opportunity to evaluate the democratic process in Bulgaria in a comparative
perspective.
Freedom House divides countries in the region into three broad categories: a) consolidated
democratic states with market economies; b) transitional polities undergoing economic
transformations; and c) repressive autocracies with statist economies. In the context of such
classification Bulgaria is defined as a transitional polity undergoing economic transformation. Its
rating for democratic performance is 3,81 (Bulgaria is the most democratic Balkan country with the
exception of Slovenia) and its rating for economic performance is 5,38 (Bulgaria is the worst
performing Balkan economy). The latest political developments in Southeast Europe ”corrected”
some of the ratings but at the same time they strengthen some important characteristics of the
Bulgarian democracy and Bulgarian transition in comparative perspective.
It is the overperformance of democratic institutions. It is the constant trend of
underperformance of Bulgarian economy, and the key finding- Bulgaria is the postcommunist country
marked by the highest discrepancy between democratic achievements and economic performance.
The stressed tendency of the disbalance of the Bulgaria transition figures out three principal
options for medium term political development:
· the stability of the democratic institutions can become the major factor for the successful policy of
market reforms relying on the fact that there are working channels for interests representation.
· the poor economic performance can undermine the stability of the democratic institutions  and as
a result Bulgaria can face destabilization scenario
· Bulgaria’s democracy can function ”divorced”, independently from the state of economy. The
political and social experience of India in the last 50 years is a powerful illustration of a such an
option.
The comparativist reflection on the character of the democratic regime in Bulgaria points out
the discrepancy of the democratic and market performances as the major feature of the existing
political system.
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RANKING AND CLASSIFICATIONS: EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND NIS
Democracy Rankings Economy Rankings
Democracy Economy Democracy Economy
Consolidated Democracies Consolidated Market Economies
Czech Republic 1.38 1.88 Hungary 1.44 1.63
Hungary 1.44 1.63 Czech Republic 1.38 1.88
Poland 1.44 2.00 Poland 1.44 2.00
Slovenia 1.88 2.38 Estonia 2.06 2.13
Estonia 2.06 2.13 Slovenia 1.88 2.38
Lithuania 2.06 2.50 Lithuania 2.06 2.50
Latvia 2.06 2.50 Latvia 2.06 2.50
Transitional Governments Transitional Economies
éRussia 3.75 3.50 Slovakia 3.81 3.38
Moldova 3.81 4.00 Russia 3.75 3.50
ê Slovakia 3.81 3.38 Kyrgystan 4.75 3.75
éBulgaria 3.81 5.38 Croatia 4.25 3.88
êRomania 3.88 4.63 êMoldova 3.81 4.00
Ukraine 3.88 4.25 Albania 4.50 4.00
Macedonia 3.88 4.50 Armenia 4.75 4.00
êCroatia 4.25 3.88 Georgia 4.75 4.13
êAlbania 4.50 4.00 éUkraine 3.88 4.25
êArmenia 4.75 4.00 Kasahstan 5.25 4.38
Kyrgystan 4.75 3.75 êMacedonia 3.88 4.50
éGeorgia 4.75 4.13 Romania 3.88 4.63
Kasahstan 5.25 4.38 Azerbaijan 5.44 5.13
Azerbaijan 5.44 5.13 êBulgaria 3.81 5.38
Consolidated Autocracies Consolidated Statist Economies
êBelarus 5.88 6.00 êBelarus 5.88 6.00
Tajikistan 6.00 6.13 Tajikistan 6.00 6.13
Uzbekistan 6.44 6.25 Uzbekistan 6.44 6.25
Turkmenistan 6.94 6.38 Turkmenistan 6.94 6.38
Source:
“Political and Economic Reform in East Central Europe and the New Independent States:
A Progress Report ”, Freedom House, 1997.
http://www.freedomhouse.org/NIT/intro_karatnycky.html
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APPENDIX ONE:
ELECTORAL DATA
Table 2. Elections in 1991, 1992, 1994, and 1996: General Data.
1991 1992 - I 1992 - II 1994 1996 - I 1996 - II
Number of election sections 12 454 12 605 12 611 12 696 12 675 12 678
Number of election districts 31 32 32 31 32 32
Number of voters according to
electoral lists
6 790 006 6 817 914 6 859 318 6 997 954 6 837 737 6 834 538
Number of voters according to
signature on electoral lists
5 699 960 5 140 449 5 204 231 5 261 040 4 302 056 4 202 590
Number of election envelops 5 694 842 5 139 891 5 206 226 5 264 448 4 317 161 4 215 145
Number of invalid votes 128 727 48 713 24 388 62 545 28 908 25 416
Number of valid votes 5 540 837 5 091 179 5 181 844 5 202 065 4 288 499 4 189 733
Percentage of invalid votes 2.26% 0.95% 0.47% 1.19% 0.67% 0.60%
Percentage of valid votes 83.87% 75.39% 75.90% 75.23% 63.14% 61.67%
Source:
“Bulgarian Elections 1990-1996: Results, Analyses, Trends”,
Democratichni tradicii - Demetra, Sofia, 1997.
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Table 3. Elections for the 7th Great National Assembly (first round on 10 June, second round 17 June, 1990): Distribution of
Mandates
Party/Coalition Majoritarian Proportional Total
Mandates % Mandates % Mandates %
Bulgarian Socialist Party 114 57.00 97 48.50 211 52.75
Union of Democratic Forces 69 34.50 75 37.50 144 36.00
Bulgarian Aggrarian Union 0 0.00 16 8.00 16 4.00
Movement for Rights and Freedoms 11 5.50 12 6.00 23 5.75
Fatherland Union 2 1.00 0 0.00 2 0.50
Independent candidates 2 1.00 0 0.00 2 0.50
Social-Democratic Party-NonMarxists 1 0.50 0 0.00 1 0.25
Fatherland Party of Labor 1 0.50 0 0.00 1 0.25
Total 200 100.00 200 100.00 400 100.00
Source:
“Bulgarian Elections 1990-1996: Results, Analyses, Trends”,
Democratichni tradicii - Demetra, Sofia, 1997
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Table 4. Elections for the 36th National Assembly (13 October, 1991): Distribution of Actual Votes and Mandates.
Party/Coalition Actual Votes % Above 4% Mandates % of Mandates
Union Of Democratic Forces 1 903 567 34.36 45.78 110 45.80
Bulgarian Socialist Party 1 836 050 33.14 44.16 106 44.20
Movemenr for Rights and Freedoms 418 168 7.55 10.06 24 10.00
Bulgarian Aggrarian Union 214 052 3.86 - - -
Bulgarian Aggrarian Union (N. Petkov) 190 454 3.44 - - -
Union of Democratic Forces (Center) 177 295 3.20 - - -
Union of Democratic Forces (Liberals) 155 902 2.81 - - -
Confederation “Bulgarian Kingdom” 100 883 1.82 - - -
Bulgarian Business Bloc 73 379 1.32 - - -
Bulgarian National Radical Party 62 462 1.13 - - -
Other 28 Parties/Coalitions (below 1% 408 625 7.37 - - -
Total 5 540 837 100.00 100.00 240 100.00
Source:
“Bulgarian Elections 1990-1996: Results, Analyses, Trends”,
Democratichni tradicii - Demetra, Sofia, 1997
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Table 5. Elections for the 37th National Assembly (18 December, 1994): Distribution of Actual Votes and Mandates.
Party/Coalition Actual Votes % Above 4% Mandates % of Mandates
Bulgarian Socialist Party 2 262 943 43.50 51.54 125 52.08
Union of Democratic Forces 1 260 374 24.23 28.70 69 28.75
People’s Union 338 478 6.51 7.71 18 7.50
Movemenr for Rights and Freedoms 283 094 5.44 6.45 15 6.25
Bulgarian Business Bloc 245 849 4.73 5.60 13 5.42
Democratic Alternative for the Republic 197 057 3.79 - - -
Bulgarian Communist Party 78 606 1.51 - - -
New Choice Union 77 641 1.49 - - -
Patriotic Union 74 350 1.43 - - -
Federation “Kingdom Bulgaria” 73 205 1.41 - - -
Other Parties/Coalitions (below 1%) 310 468 5.97 - - -
Total 5 202 065 100.00 100.00 240 100.00
Source:
“Bulgarian Elections 1990-1996: Results, Analyses, Trends”,
Democratichni tradicii - Demetra, Sofia, 1997
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Table 6. Elections for the 36th and 37 th National Assemblies: District Distribution of Party Mandates in 1991 and 1994.
District 1991 1994
UDF BSP MRF Total BSP UDF PU MRF BBB Total
Blagoevgrad 5 3 2 10 6 3 0 1 0 10
Bourgas 5 5 2 12 5 3 1 2 1 12
Varna 7 5 1 13 5 5 1 0 2 13
Great Turnovo 4 5 0 9 5 2 1 0 1 9
Vidin 1 3 0 4 3 1 0 0 0 4
Vratza 3 5 0 8 6 1 1 0 0 8
Gabrovo 3 1 0 4 2 2 0 0 1 5
Dobrich 2 4 1 7 5 1 1 0 0 7
Kurdzali 0 2 6 8 2 0 0 4 0 6
Kiustendil 3 2 0 5 3 2 0 0 0 5
Lovech 2 3 0 5 3 2 0 0 0 5
Montana 3 3 0 6 5 1 0 0 0 6
Pazardzik 4 5 0 9 5 3 1 0 0 9
Pernik 3 2 0 5 3 2 0 0 0 5
Pleven 4 5 0 9 5 2 2 0 1 10
City of Plovdiv 7 3 0 10 3 6 0 0 1 10
District of Plovdiv 5 5 1 11 5 4 2 0 0 11
Razgrad 0 2 3 5 2 0 0 3 0 5
Rousse 4 3 1 8 5 2 0 0 1 8
Silistra 1 2 2 5 3 0 0 1 0 4
Sliven 3 3 0 6 5 1 1 0 0 7
Smolian 2 2 0 4 3 1 0 0 0 4
Sofia 1 9 3 0 12 4 6 1 0 1 12
Sofia 2 8 3 0 11 3 6 1 0 1 11
Sofia 3 7 3 0 10 5 5 0 0 1 11
District of Sofia 4 4 0 8 5 2 1 0 0 8
Stara Zagora 5 6 0 11 5 3 2 0 1 11
Turgovishte 0 2 2 4 3 0 0 1 0 4
Haskovo 3 5 1 9 5 1 1 1 1 9
Shumen 1 4 2 7 3 1 0 2 0 6
Yambol 2 3 0 5 3 1 1 0 0 5
Countrywide 110 106 24 240 125 69 18 15 13 240
Source:
“Bulgarian Elections 1990-1996: Results, Analyses, Trends”,
Democratichni tradicii - Demetra, Sofia, 1997
REGISTERED DISASTERS, ACCIDENTS, AND CATASTROPHES
Year Number (total)                 Losses (total) for the period
for the period Material losses (lv) Victims Wounded
1993       34 606           578 183 701   1 394   7 831
1994       28 411           311 381 466   1 546   8 582
1995       16 350           151 539 500   1 404   8 447
1996       14 496        2 307 922 895   1 293   7 719
1997         8 337      17 944 444 000      626   3 759
Total     102 200      21 293 471 562   6 263 36 338
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